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Strategies for Preventing Terrorism Attacks in the Capital City of Nusantara

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Abstract: The relocation of Indonesia's capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan aims to address challenges such as environmental risks, pollution, congestion, and overpopulation. Nusantara (IKN) is designed as a new administrative hub to promote economic equality, regional development, and sustainability. However, this transition also introduces security risks, particularly from Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a terrorist group with a history of attacks in East Kalimantan. A comprehensive security strategy is crucial to protect IKN from potential terrorist threats. This study applies the PPRR (Prevention, Preparation, Response, Recovery) theory using a qualitative approach, analyzing data from scientific journals, government reports, and other publications. Findings indicate that IKN faces a medium risk of attack. While an immediate attack is unlikely, potential consequences include physical damage, casualties, and national instability. Key risk factors include IKN's strategic location, past terrorist activities in the region, and security infrastructure vulnerabilities. To mitigate these risks, strategic measures are needed, including enhancing intelligence capabilities, reinforcing security in IKN, and addressing ideological threats. Implementing a PPRR-based strategy is essential for stability, minimizing attack risks, and ensuring long-term security, allowing IKN to emerge as a resilient symbol of national governance.

Keyword: Threat, Vulnerability, Risk, Terrorism, IKN.

INTRODUCTION

The relocation of the Indonesian capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan is a significant administrative and transformational initiative. This action is predicated on a multitude of intricate strategic factors, which underscore the necessity of resolving the issues in Jakarta and establishing a more sustainable future (Anirwan et al., 2024). Jakarta, the economic and political hub, is confronted with substantial obstacles. The city is plagued by chronic traffic congestion, air pollution, and a high population density. Furthermore, the city is experiencing supplementary stress as a result of the escalating environmental hazards, including flooding and land subsidence, which are a direct result of the overexploitation of groundwater (Saraswati &

Adi, 2022). The government is compelled to identify long-term solutions to these issues in order to mitigate Jakarta's burden and guarantee the continuity of national development.

The Penajam Paser Utara and Kutai Kartanegara regions in East Kalimantan Province have been officially designated by President Joko Widodo as the site for the construction of a new capital city, Nusantara (Presiden RI, 2019). The objective of this relocation is to establish a new, more sustainable development center. East Kalimantan is considered a strategic location due to its lower environmental danger than Jakarta. The region is relatively secure from earthquakes and tsunamis and provides a vast expanse of land for environmentally friendly urban development (Rizqiyah, 2023). It is anticipated that the relocation of the capital will serve as a catalyst for equitable development in eastern Indonesia, which has been behind Java (Aji et al., 2023).

The government aims to reduce national economic disparities, encourage investment, and create employment by establishing a new center of economic growth (Simanjuntak et al., 2024). In addition, the Nusantara Capital City (IKN) is being constructed to promote environmental sustainability, which includes the implementation of an efficient public transportation system, the utilization of renewable energy, and the implementation of effective refuse management (Ichwan et al., 2022). IKN is conceptualized as a smart city. The objective of this concept is to establish a contemporary city that optimizes the quality of life for its inhabitants by integrating digital technology. In order to establish an urban environment that is sustainable, efficient, and inclusive, this smart city will incorporate a variety of systems, including smart transportation, water management, and environmentally friendly infrastructure (Syailendra & Hanggono, 2024).

The relocation of the capital city also introduces new security risks, despite its numerous potential benefits. The geographical location of East Kalimantan is one of the primary concerns. East Kalimantan is more susceptible to hazards, both military and non-military, in contrast to Jakarta, which is shielded by the land and oceans. The relocation of the capital city also introduces new security hazards, despite its potential. The geographical location of East Kalimantan is one of the primary concerns. East Kalimantan is more susceptible to hazards, both military and non-military, in contrast to Jakarta, which is shielded by the land and oceans (Riptanto & Hasan, 2024). The social, political, economic, and security conditions of the community can be significantly impacted by these threats, which can be posed by both state and non-state actors (Alfajri et al., 2019).

In accordance with the 2008 Indonesian Defense White Paper, a military threat is defined as the organized use of armed force that has the potential to jeopardize the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the territory, and the safety of the entire population. Armed rebellion, sabotage, espionage, armed terror, acts of aggression, border violations, and disruption of maritime and air security, as well as inter-community conflicts, are all examples of this type of threat. In contrast, non-military threats are essentially threats that rely on non-military factors that have the capacity to jeopardize the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the territory, and the protection of the entire nation.

Ideology, politics, economics, socio-culture, technology, information, and public safety are among the numerous dimensions that these hazards can encompass. In Indonesia, the following are examples of non-military threats: terrorism, separatism, cyber attacks, natural disasters, cultural infiltration, and infectious disease outbreaks (Kemhan RI, 2008). In the past decade, terrorism and radicalism have emerged as significant challenges that must be addressed. These threats are classified as non-military (Sinaga, 2021). The following factors influence the potential hazard of terrorism to the IKN:

1. Geographical Factors

IKN's susceptibility to security threats, such as terrorism, is also influenced by its strategic location and geographical factors. IKN is situated in close proximity to international

borders, such as Malaysia, which is approximately $\pm 2,062$ km distant (Saraswati & Adi, 2022). Furthermore, the risk of cross-border threats is further exacerbated by its proximity to the Southern Philippines, an area that is susceptible to the activities of radical groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Kapiarsa, 2020).

Nevertheless, this strategic location is not immune to potential security concerns. The Makassar Strait is frequently employed as a transport route for illicit goods and human trafficking, as well as the threat of terrorism associated with the Bulukumba and Enrekang regions (Datwurina & Rizkiana, 2022). The Sulu-Celebes Sea is also in close proximity to the IKN. A vulnerable border zone, the Sulu-Celebes Sea is situated in the northeast of Borneo and shares borders with the southern Philippines and Sabah, East Malaysia. The Sulu-Celebes Sea is frequently the site of a variety of organized unlawful activities due to its porous nature and perceived low level of security.

These activities encompass the presence of armed militias, terrorist groups, separatist movements, and piracy. The region's instability is further exacerbated by the insufficient oversight of state authorities over the free movement of products and individuals, which promotes the growth of illegal activities. In this region, the black market in firearms and small arms is a hotbed due to the limited oversight by central authorities, which is frequently exploited by specific terrorist organizations (Rahman et al., 2023).

2. East Kalimantan's History of Terrorist Attacks

The region of East Kalimantan has a history of numerous terrorism incidents, which underscores its susceptibility to similar threats in the future. The molotov bomb incident at the Oikumene Church in Samarinda in 2016, which resulted in fatalities and injuries, was one of the most notable events (Badriyanto, 2018). Furthermore, Ali Imron and his associates utilized the Mahakam Delta region on Tanjung Berukang Island, Kutai Kartanegara, as a refuge during the Bali Bombing I (Liputan6, 2003). The threat of terrorism in this region persisted until 2019, when Densus 88 successfully apprehended Abu Arkam, a member of the Ansharut Daulah (JAD) Network, in Berau (Tempo, 2019).

The geography of East Kalimantan, which is characterized by forest areas, presents a potential strategic location for terrorist organizations to conceal themselves. A comparable illustration is the strategy of the Eastern Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) terrorist organization in Poso, which employs the forest as a secure location for their operations (Litha, 2021). MIT, which is currently operating in Central Sulawesi, is situated in close proximity to East Kalimantan, with the Makassar Strait serving as the sole barrier.

Additionally, the risk of infiltration by cross-border terrorist groups based in the region is elevated by the relatively close proximity of the Sulu Islands in the Southern Philippines, which is approximately 530 km. The confluence of these factors places East Kalimantan, which includes the location of the new IKN, in a position that is susceptible to threat of terrorism (Kapiarsa, 2020).

3. Cultural and Social Diversity

The IKN's social and cultural diversity can be both an asset and a vulnerability, particularly if it is not managed effectively. The region is characterized by a substantial amount of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. If not properly managed, this diversity can lead to social friction that may ultimately escalate into conflict. Research has demonstrated that the ethnic fragmentation index (EFI) in the IKN region is elevated, suggesting the prevalence of a wide range of ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the ethnic polarization index (EPOI) is at a moderately elevated level, which represents the potential tension or distance between ethnic groups. If not managed appropriately, this can precipitate conflict. This polarization suggests the possibility of tension that may result from discrepancies in the views, interests, or values of various ethnic groups.

The migration of new residents as a consequence of the development of the IKN exacerbates this risk. The potential for social friction can be exacerbated by the cultural disparities between indigenous people and newcomers, particularly in the absence of sufficient integration initiatives (Gunawan et al., 2024).

4. Social and Economic Transformation

Complex challenges for the local community are presented by the economic and social changes that have arisen as a result of the relocation and development of the IKN. The transition from a pastoral to an urban environment can result in social dissatisfaction and conflict, particularly among local residents who perceive themselves as being displaced by these changes. The risk of social jealousy is also elevated by the influx of migrants who are involved in the development of IKN in the absence of an effective integration mechanism. Uneven urbanization can result in a disparity between groups that perceive themselves as benefited and those that perceive themselves as disadvantaged, which can lead to social tensions (Ayyubi et al., 2023). Furthermore, the swift economic change poses a significant challenge due to the low level of education among the local population (Kapiarsa, 2020).

Indigenous individuals may be surpassed by newcomers who possess superior talents or resources due to the heightened competition for employment opportunities, land, and other resources. This situation not only increases the likelihood of unemployment and destitution, but also presents opportunities for radical groups to recruit new members (Sutanto, 2022). The potential for conflict exists as a result of the development of the IKN on land that holds symbolic and economic value for indigenous people.

The deprivation of access to natural resources, including forest products, fisheries, and agricultural land, can result in profound dissatisfaction (Sari & Naftali, 2024). The history of Indonesia demonstrates that agrarian violence has become a prevalent phenomenon, and land conflicts frequently arise during the process of regional conversion. Repressive land takeovers resulted in the loss of farmers' livelihoods during the "Orde Baru" era, as land policies were influenced by global capitalism (Astuti, 2011). Customary councils or ethnic security groups are frequently established in response to the dissatisfaction of indigenous peoples in order to safeguard their rights. Advocating for customary rights is a critical function of councils like the Dayak Customary Council of Kalimantan (DADK), which occasionally resort to the prospect of violence to enforce their demands. This method is indicative of a profound sense of annoyance with policies that are perceived as unjust and as favoring corporations over indigenous peoples (Bakker, 2023).

IKN has recognized several factors that may contribute to conflict and acts of terrorism. Terrorist strikes would not only impair developmental continuity but also jeopardize the stability of Indonesia's new governmental capital. This may impede the attainment of the IKN's objective as a symbol of advancement and a cohesive governmental hub. An extensive investigation of the diverse threats and vulnerabilities in the IKN is necessary to mitigate such risks. By doing meticulous risk mapping, the government can pinpoint regions and vulnerability factors, including geographical location, socio-cultural conditions, and political elements, that may instigate or intensify prospective attacks.

This risk analysis serves as a crucial foundation for developing effective and lasting preventive actions. This research seeks to provide a thorough and proactive prevention plan to counter the threat of terrorism in the IKN, grounded in Rachel Derr's theory. This theory emphasizes the importance of comprehensively knowing unique vulnerabilities and threats, especially through geographical and socio-cultural studies, as these elements can greatly influence the security risk level in the area. As a governmental hub with significant visibility and a strategic function, IKN necessitates a security system that is resilient, adaptable, and sensitive to evolving threats.


METHOD

This research utilizes a qualitative methodology and a literature review to assess the strategy for preventing terrorist attacks in the IKN. The literature review methodology entails the gathering and examination of secondary material from many pertinent sources, such as scientific journals, books, government reports, and other articles and publications. Subsequently, we performed a comprehensive analysis of the gathered data utilizing the preventive, preparation, response, and recovery planning (PPRR) theoretical framework. This methodology seeks to build a comprehensive preventative plan that establishes a security system in the IKN capable of adapting to and responding to threats. We anticipate that this methodology will substantially aid in formulating a security policy that not only safeguards IKN as a new governmental hub but also equips it to adapt to and endure future difficulties. This approach is anticipated to create a stable and sustainable governmental framework that promotes national growth.

The Concept of Threat, Vulnerability, Risk Assessments, and PPRR

Hack Prunckun's framework delineates that threat analysis constitutes the initial phase of a triadic approach to formulating a counterterrorism strategy, alongside vulnerability and risk assessments. The latter two steps involve vulnerability and risk assessments. The outcomes of these three studies underpin the formulation of policies encompassing preventive, preparedness, response, and recovery planning (PPRR). Threat analysis is a crucial process for comprehending and predicting the hazards encountered by an organization or nation. The method seeks to identify potential hazards that may endanger personnel, physical assets, or overall security. A threat in security is defined as the desire of a threat agent, be it an individual, group, or organization, to inflict harm or cause disruption.

Unlike natural hazards, the dangers examined in this research stem from human acts driven by intent and capability. The threat analysis method entails the identification and assessment of danger agents' capabilities based on four criteria: desire, expectation, knowledge, and resources. Desire reflects the strength of the intention to attain a particular objective; expectation conveys the threat agent's conviction regarding the efficacy of their efforts. Knowledge encompasses information or technical skills that facilitate the implementation of threats, while resources refer to any financial, technological, or network support that enhances their capabilities.



Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

Figure 1. Threat Analysis

The subsequent step following threat identification is assessment. Table 1 provides an illustrative threat summary that demonstrates a frequently utilized assessment technique

Table 1. Threat scoring

Scale	Score	Tally	Scale	Score	Tally
	Desire			Knowledge	
Negligible		1	Negligible		1
Minimum		2	Minimum		2
Medium		3	Medium		3
High		4	High		4
Acute		5	Acute		5
	Expectation			Resource	
Negligible		1	Negligible		1
Minimum		2	Minimum		2
Medium		3	Medium		3
High		4	High		4
Acute		5	Acute		5
	Total			Total	
				Sub Total	

Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

The outcomes of the threat assessment are thereafter conveyed by a threat scale, accompanied by the following elucidation:


Table 2: Threat Scale

Threat Level	Coefficient
Negligible	4-6
Minimum	7-10
Medium	11-15
High	16-18
Acute	19-20

Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

The second stage is vulnerability analysis, which identifies vulnerabilities in an asset that could be exploited by threat agents. People, organizations, or physical entities, such as critical infrastructure, that necessitate protection are examples of assets. The assessment of vulnerability is founded on the resilience of an asset in the presence of threat damage, which can result in minor disruptions or major disasters.

The attractiveness of the target, the simplicity of attack, and the potential impact are all factors that influence vulnerability. This model classifies assets, evaluates the significance of each asset, and determines the potential consequences of the asset being subjected to threats. Questions are posed to evaluate the attractiveness of the target (e.g., target visibility and symbolic status), the ease of attack (e.g., the level of security control efficacy), and the impact (e.g., the number of people and the financial value of losses).



Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

Figure 2: Vulnerability Analysis

The subsequent action is to evaluate the vulnerability after it has been effectively identified. The vulnerability summary example in Table 3 is an example of a model that is frequently employed to evaluate vulnerability.

Table 3. Vulnerability scoring

Scale	Score	Tally	Scale	Score	Tally
	Attractiveness			Impact	
Negligible		1	Negligible		1
Minimum		2	Minimum		2
Medium		3	Medium		3
High		4	High		4
Acute		5	Acute		5
	Ease of Attack			Total	
Negligible		1		Sub Total	
Minimum		2			
Medium		3			
High		4			
Acute		5			
	Total				

Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

Next, the vulnerability measurement results are interpreted in the form of a vulnerability scale, which is explained as follows:

Table 4. Vulnerability Scale

Vulnerability	Coefficient	Qualifier (i.e., conditioning statements)	Vulnerability	Coefficient	Qualifier (i.e., conditioning statements)
Negligible	1-3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can only be attacked successfully if the threat agent has an acute threat coefficient; or • Has little or no importance; or • The range of security measures makes attack very difficult; or • If attacked, the information has little utility to cause harm. 	High	10-12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can only be successfully attacked if the threat agent has a minimum threat coefficient (or greater); or • Has a sizable amount of importance associated with it; or • The range of security measures makes penetration undemanding; or • If attacked, the information has a high degree of utility to cause harm.
Minimum	4-6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can only be attacked successfully if the threat agent has a high coefficient (or greater); or • Has limited importance; or • The range of security measures makes attack difficult; or • If attacked, the information has only some utility to cause harm. 	Acute	13-15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can only be successfully attacked if the threat agent has a low threat coefficient (or greater); or • Has a very high level of importance associated with it; or • The range of security measures is nonexistent; or • If attacked, the information will cause immediate and/or extreme harm.
Medium	7-9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can only be successfully penetrated if the threat agent has a medium coefficient (or greater); or • Has reasonable amount of importance associated with it; or • The range of security measures makes penetration moderately difficult; or • If attacked, the information has a moderate level of utility to cause harm. 			

Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

The final stage is risk assessment or risk analysis, which refers to the potential for loss or negative influence as a result of a combination of vulnerabilities and threats. The likelihood of a threat occurring and the consequences or impact if the threat does occur are the two factors that are used to measure risk. A peril that has a high probability of occurring and a significant impact on vulnerable assets will result in a high risk. In general, the risk analysis process entails evaluating the probability of specific events and their repercussions, and subsequently determining whether the risk is either acceptable or necessitates mitigation.

$$risk = likelihood + consequence$$

Source: Scientific methods of inquiry for intelligence analysis

Figure 3: Vulnerability Analysis

The integration of these three analyses results in a comprehensive policy foundation for PPRR (Prevention, Preparation, Response, and Recovery Planning). The PPRR policy is a comprehensive strategy for managing risks and crises, particularly those that are associated with hazards such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or other emergency situations. Each component of the PPRR is intended to mitigate the impact, expedite the response, and guarantee

the successful recovery following a hazardous event. The prevention stage is designed to identify dangers that have the potential to trigger a crisis and to implement measures to prevent them from occurring. Physical security strategies, cybersecurity policies, and law enforcement initiatives can all be implemented to prevent threats from reaching their intended targets. Additionally, the prevention strategy may encompass education and socialization initiatives that are designed to mitigate the community's susceptibility to specific hazards. In the interim, the element of preparation underscores the significance of readiness, despite the implementation of preventive measures.

Response team training, resource procurement, crisis simulations, and the creation of contingency plans that are tailored to address a variety of scenarios are all components of readiness. This preparation allows organizations to effectively address hazards and mitigate the consequences of an incident. To guarantee that the response team is consistently prepared for evolving threats, it is essential to conduct routine training and update crisis protocols. In the interim, response is a direct action that is conducted in the context of an incident. In order to promptly resolve the crisis, the response entails the mobilization of resources, the implementation of security measures, and the coordination with other agencies. For example, in the event of a terrorist attack, response measures may involve the enforcement of secure zones, evacuation, and emergency communication with the public. It is crucial to promptly address a crisis in order to mitigate losses and safeguard lives.

The final component is rehabilitation, which is the process of repairing and reestablishing the situation to its pre-crisis state. This procedure encompasses both physical recovery, which involves the restoration of damaged infrastructure, and psychological recovery, which is intended to assist victims who have been impacted. The recovery element takes into account the most severe possible outcome, which occurs when preventive and preparatory measures are insufficient to mitigate severe consequences. A recovery plan that is effective enables organizations or communities to recover more rapidly and prevent the long-term repercussions of a crisis (Prunckun, 2014).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The relocation of the capital city to East Kalimantan presents a variety of strategic hazards that must be anticipated. The IKN is susceptible to smuggling, cross-border crime, and terrorist activities due to its geographic proximity to the Malaysian and Philippine borders and significant shipping lanes, including the South China Sea, the Sulu-Celebes Sea, and the Makassar Strait. The risk of social tensions is exacerbated by ethnic diversity, accelerated urbanization, and potential agrarian conflicts with indigenous peoples in socio-cultural aspects. The competition for resources and employment is further exacerbated by the influx of newcomers, which can lead to instability. In order to safeguard the stability of the IKN as the new central government, an integrated security strategy is required, as it is anticipated that local groups and international militants will pose a security threat.

Threat Assessment

The relocation of Indonesia's strategic center of gravity from Jakarta to East Kalimantan has the potential to establish a new focal point that could serve as a strategic target in the event of conflicts or terrorist attacks. Local or international organizations may execute terrorist attacks that concentrate on the IKN. Several factors contribute to the increase in vulnerability, including the history of terrorist attacks in the region, local social and cultural dynamics, and geography. The history of events involving terrorist groups in this region includes the apprehension of terrorists such as Ali Imron and Abu Akram, as well as the bomb explosion at the Oikumene Church in Samarinda by the JAD group.

This demonstrates that domestic militants have targeted East Kalimantan as a location for attack and concealment for an extended period of time, prior to the region's designation as

the new capital. East Kalimantan is situated in close proximity to Central Sulawesi, where the MIT group is still active, and the Southern Philippines, which serves as the headquarters for radical organizations like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Sulu Islands. Nevertheless, there is currently no evidence indicating that these two organizations were involved in terrorist activities in East Kalimantan.

Consequently, the JI and JAD categories are the most susceptible to threats. Despite the official dissolution of the two organizations, certain reports suggest that the terrorist network's cells continue to exist. A number of JI members reportedly joined the JAD group after the group's dissolution, suggesting a revival of the organization (Tempo, 2024). The JAD group has a lengthy history of conducting lethal terrorist attacks. Since 2015, this organization has been documented as perpetrating at least 28 attacks that have resulted in 86 fatalities and 217 injuries, as per the Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2024). The perpetrators of these attacks exhibit a high degree of confidence and courage. One such instance is the 2016 Thamrin Bombing, in which the perpetrator openly displayed his visage in a crowd while firing at the police.

This disposition is indicative of their assurance regarding the efficacy of their initiatives. JAD is recognized as having a direct connection to ISIS, which offers ideological and operational support, as well as bomb-making procedures and training. In conflict zones such as Syria, certain members of this organization receive direct military training from experienced parties (Halim & Asril, 2019). Furthermore, JAD maintains an extensive funding network. The group is known to acquire funds from countries such as Afghanistan in addition to receiving financial assistance from ISIS (CNN, 2019).

Additionally, they capitalize on donations from mosques (CNN, 2018) and disasters, including the earthquake in Cianjur, to raise funds (Rahmawati, 2023). The group's proficiency in explosive assembly was acquired through both self-education and online resources. The JAD attack's success was inextricably linked to the meticulous and coordinated plotting that preceded the Thamrin Bombing. The JAD group can leverage the internet media to collect information about the construction of the IKN if it is related to potential threats to the IKN. As they have done in previous assaults, they can analyze the target terrain and devise an effective attack strategy using the data they have collected.

Conflicts may arise from local residents who are dissatisfied with the construction of the IKN, in addition to threats from terrorist groups. This dissatisfaction is primarily driven by the question of impartiality in the acquisition of land (Triwibowo, 2024). Agrarian conflicts associated with land acquisition have become more prevalent since the relocation of the capital city was announced. 20 cases of plantation land conflicts were reported by the East Kalimantan Provincial Plantation Office in February 2024, and 48 instances were reported throughout 2023, with only 13 of them being successfully resolved.

The existence of unresolved land conflict issues is indicated by this data (Prabawati, 2024). The resolution of these land conflict issues is often complex, as they involve a variety of factors, such as economic, social, and cultural factors, and they frequently persist for decades (Walhi, 2018). The potential for violence is exacerbated by the inability to effectively resolve land conflicts. This threat may manifest as warnings of potential physical conflict or actions to boycott projects that are perceived as harmful to their rights. A number of farmers were detained by the police in February 2024 for allegedly threatening the construction of the VVIP Airport IKN project, which is one of the most recent cases.

During the protest, it was reported that the farmers were in possession of pointed weapons (Rahma et al., 2024). The geographical area and the surrounding environment, including shortcuts and hard-to-reach areas in the forest, are well-known to local residents who have resided in the vicinity of the IKN for an extended period. This knowledge allows them to monitor the development process of the IKN, initiate protests, and easily escape or hide without

being detected by security forces. This local comprehension also enables them to employ geographical conditions as a weapon in their pursuit of their rights.

The threat of violence occasionally arises during demonstrations; however, these actions are typically not intended to result in fatalities. Essentially, these actions are engaged in as a means of demanding their rights, which are deemed to be disregarded. In reality, numerous reports demonstrate that law enforcement officials frequently resort to repressive measures against local communities during this conflict, which is indicative of the inequality in the management of issues that should be addressed with a more inclusive and equitable approach. Consequently, the study did not account for the assessment of the hazard posed by local residents. The subsequent phase is to evaluate each variable using the data that is currently available, as indicated by the aforementioned explanation:

Table. 5 Threat score in IKN

Scale	Score	Tally	Scale	Score	Tally
	Desire			Knowledge	
Negligible	1		Negligible	1	
Minimum	2	2	Minimum	2	
Medium	3		Medium	3	3
High	4		High	4	
Acute	5		Acute	5	
	Expectation			Resource	
Negligible	1		Negligible	1	
Minimum	2		Minimum	2	
Medium	3	3	Medium	3	3
High	4		High	4	
Acute	5		Acute	5	
	Total	5		Total	6
				Sub Total	11

Source: Reserach data

The JAD Group's cumulative score for the threat of a terrorist attack in the IKN reached 11 based on Table 5. This suggests that the threat level is classified as medium. This implies that the potential for an attack is still substantial and requires serious consideration, despite the fact that the threat is not at a high level. The medium category suggests that the JAD group possesses the motivation and capability to execute an attack, despite the low probability of such an event occurring in the near future. Nevertheless, the strategic implications of an attack on the IKN and the vulnerability of the region render this threat pertinent for consideration in security strategy.

Vulnerability Assessment

The relocation of Indonesia's capital city to East Kalimantan presents substantial security vulnerabilities, particularly in terms of its strategic appeal, simplicity of access for an attack, and potential consequences. The IKN is a source of concern for terrorist organizations due to its status as the new center of governance and a national symbol. These groups frequently regard strategic locations, such as the IKN, as an opportunity to broaden their influence, exhibit their capacity to assault critical locations, and instill widespread fear in the community. Furthermore, these actions have the potential to disrupt the country's stability by attracting national and international public attention (Nussio et al., 2021).

Attacks on the IKN also possess an ideological component for terrorist organizations. They may perceive these attacks as a form of jihad in order to combat what they perceive as infidelity. For instance, organizations such as JAD target the government because it is perceived as a tyrant or ruler who violates religious principles (Ramadhyas, 2020).

The inspiration for such attacks can be traced back to significant attacks on other centers of government, such as the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which succeeded in instilling widespread dread in the community. The success of such actions frequently serves as an incentive for other terrorist organizations to concentrate on power centers, such as the IKN, in order to accomplish their objectives. The IKN's status as a symbol

of state power and authority renders attacks on it highly strategic. The potential for physical harm and the dissemination of dread among the public are both present when the heart of government is attacked. Furthermore, such assaults can convey a powerful message to the government and the public that terrorist organizations are capable of breaching state security and disrupting national stability.

The IKN is an extremely appealing potential target for terrorist groups that wish to demonstrate their strength and presence, due to its extensive influence on both a national and international scale (Syihab & Hatta, 2023). As a new development project, the IKN's infrastructure is still in the development stage. Consequently, the security system may be susceptible to exploitation by terrorist groups and may not be optimal.

An attack on the IKN will have a profound effect, as it is not only the new center of government but also a component of the government's main initiative to balance national development. As an administrative center, the IKN is intended to serve as a centralized location for government offices, resulting in a high concentration of human resources and a high level of office activity.

As a result, any terrorist attack that targets the IKN area has the potential to directly disrupt the government's operations and result in a significant loss of life. Furthermore, the long-term consequences could undermine Indonesia's international reputation, undermine public confidence in security, and disrupt national stability.

The following phase is to evaluate each variable using the available data, as indicated by the aforementioned explanation:

Table 6. Threat score in IKN

Scale	Score	Tally	Scale	Score	Tally
	Attractiveness			Impact	
Negligible	1		Negligible	1	
Minimum	2		Minimum	2	
Medium	3		Medium	3	3
High	4	4	High	4	
Acute	5		Acute	5	
	Ease of Attack			Total	3
Negligible	1			Sub Total	9
Minimum	2	2			
Medium	3				
High	4				
Acute	5				
	Total	6			

Source: Reserach data

According to Table 6, the overall vulnerability score is 9, which belongs to the medium category. This score suggests that, despite the fact that the threat is not significantly elevated, the potential for vulnerability persists and necessitates severe consideration. The medium category suggests that there are numerous factors that specific terrorist organizations can exploit to execute operations that undermine the stability of the IKN. These factors may encompass the potential for conflict with local groups, regional accessibility, or suboptimal security infrastructure. Despite the fact that this level of vulnerability is not critical, the repercussions of exploiting it can still be substantial, particularly in terms of the sustainability of the IKN as the new center of government.

Risk Assessment

According to the preceding explanation, terrorist assaults in the East Kalimantan region had already transpired prior to the commencement of the IKN construction. An instance of this is the JAD group's assault on a sanctuary. The potential for similar assaults in the IKN region is heightened by the extreme ideology that JAD has adopted, which regards the government system as a form of infidelity. The IKN area, which is currently a symbol of state authority, can be regarded as a strategic objective by the group in light of this ideology. The threat is

substantial enough to warrant anticipation, as evidenced by the medium likelihood of this attack. It is anticipated that a terrorist attack on the IKN will have a significant impact, resulting in actual physical damage, casualties, and the disruption of national stability. The IKN is a symbol of state authority and serves as the new center of government. Therefore, an attack on it will not only harm the physical infrastructure but also harm the public's sense of security and the country's international reputation.

Consequently, it is imperative to take immediate action to avert this scenario. The measures that can be implemented include the enhancement of security measures in the vicinity of the IKN, the enhancement of intelligence to identify potential attacks in advance, and the implementation of a comprehensive strategy to address the ideological threats posed by terrorist organizations like JAD. By making these endeavors, the risk of attack can be reduced, and the IKN's growth as a secure government center can be sustained.

A Strategy for Preventing Terrorist Attacks

Strategic guidance in managing this risk can be obtained through a PPPR (Prevention, Preparation, Response, Recovery) analysis of the threat of terrorist attacks in the IKN. The PPPR analysis result is as follows, as indicated by the information provided above:

Prevention: Various approaches, including diplomatic cooperation, intensive monitoring, and stringent surveillance, are employed to minimize potential threats in the context of preventive measures against terrorist attacks. Sophisticated technology, including drones, CCTV cameras, and AI-based systems, is employed to detect suspicious activity in vulnerable areas during monitoring and surveillance. Furthermore, it is a strategic move to enhance the intelligence network in order to identify threats from both within and outside the country.

The counter-radicalization and deradicalization strategies are also critical components of prevention attempts. The objective of counter-radicalization is to prevent the dissemination of extreme ideologies through public campaigns and education, whereas deradicalization is dedicated to altering the perspectives of individuals who have been exposed to radical ideas in order to facilitate their reintegration into society. Efforts to prevent terrorist attacks can also be carried out through a community-based approach (community crime prevention), which focuses on strengthening the capacity of communities to address crime through the development of sustainable social control.

Communities involved in this effort can serve as social control agents and create a resilient environment against the threat of extremism (Apriliasari & Priyanto, 2024). In order to prevent the infiltration of cross-border terrorist organizations, it is essential to engage in diplomatic cooperation with neighboring countries, particularly in the security of strategic crossing points like ALKI II. This collaboration enables countries that share waters to exchange information, conduct collaborative patrols, and establish emergency response protocols. Furthermore, prevention necessitates an adequate military presence at strategic crossing points.

Preparation: Preparation underscores the significance of being prepared to confront hazards, despite the implementation of preventive measures. Densus88, BNPT, TNI, PPATK, medical teams, psychologists, and firefighters can participate in the establishment of a trained and coordinated response team. In order to guarantee the team's efficiency, it is imperative to implement consistent training and assault simulations. Furthermore, logistics, including emergency vehicles, safety equipment, and dependable communication systems, are being fortified as part of the preparations. Preparation also involves the community by providing education on emergency protocols and security measures.

Response: The most effective method of mitigating the effects of a terrorist attack is to implement a swift and coordinated response. The security team of the IKN must have an emergency response protocol that encompasses the efficient evacuation of residents, the management of hazards, and the security of the area. In order to promptly provide medical and logistical assistance, it is imperative to assure coordination with hospitals, fire departments, and

emergency units. It is also crucial to establish joint protocols between Densus 88, BNPT, TNI, PPATK, and other relevant institutions. These protocols should encompass the division of roles, communication, and operational steps in order to substantially reduce the impact of the attack.

Recovery: The recovery phase is dedicated to the restoration of the IKN to its pre-terrorist semblance and the enhancement of long-term resilience. In order to ensure that public services can resume their normal operations, it is imperative that the physical infrastructure and technology be promptly restored. In order to facilitate the mental recovery of the afflicted community and prevent trauma, the government must also offer psychological support. Simultaneously, an exhaustive assessment of the assault is implemented to pinpoint deficiencies that necessitate remediation.

CONCLUSION

The relocation of capital city to East Kalimantan faces significant security threats, especially from terrorist groups such as JAD. Based on the analysis table, the threat level of JAD attacks is on a medium scale with a score of 11, indicating a potential threat that requires serious attention. The vulnerability of the region is also in the medium category with a score of 9, influenced by suboptimal security infrastructure and regional accessibility. The level of possibility of a terror attack on the IKN by groups such as JAD is at a medium scale, indicating that the threat is significant enough to be anticipated even though it is not too high in the near future. With extreme ideologies that consider the government as infidel, the IKN, as a symbol of state authority, becomes an attractive strategic target.

As a result, if an attack occurs, it is estimated to be large-scale, including severe physical damage, casualties, and disruption of national stability. Such attacks can also undermine public confidence and Indonesia's reputation in the international arena, thus emphasizing the importance of mitigation measures through strengthened intelligence, surveillance, and integrated security in the IKN area. This analysis highlights the importance of implementing a security strategy through the PPPR approach.

Preventive measures emphasize strengthened intelligence, technology surveillance, counter-radicalization including a community approach, and cross-country cooperation. Preparation involves the formation of a trained emergency response team and community education. The response is focused on quick action to reduce the impact of an attack, while recovery includes infrastructure repair and psychological support. With these steps, the risk of attack can be minimized, and the stability of the IKN as the new center of government can be maintained, supporting the sustainability of development and national security.

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