

**JLPH:**
**Journal of Law, Politic
and Humanities**

E-ISSN: 2962-2816
P-ISSN: 2747-1985

<https://dinastires.org/JLPH> ✉ dinasti.info@gmail.com ☎ +62 811 7404 455

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.38035/jlph.v5i6>
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Analysis of Propaganda in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on YouTube Tribun Timur (March-July 2024)

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Abstract: This study, titled Analysis Propaganda in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on YouTube Tribun Timur (March-July 2024), aims to reveal propaganda patterns in digital news coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The research subjects are five videos with the highest engagement on the Tribun Timur YouTube channel from March to July 2024. This study uses content analysis and literature review methods to identify the forms of messages, symbols, and visual communication techniques used in shaping public opinion. The results of the study show that the videos consistently portray the military superiority of Russia and undermine the position of Ukraine using specific propaganda techniques such as the use of negative terminology, symbolic visuals, the omission of opposing information, and dramatic narratives. In addition, a narrative pattern was found that aligns with Russia's "firehose of falsehood" propaganda model, which is massive, fast, and inconsistent with objective truth. The conclusion of this study states that YouTube Tribun Timur has become a potential channel for the spread of transnational propaganda that could threaten Indonesia's information resilience if not subject to continuous monitoring and critical analysis by the relevant authorities.

Keyword: Propaganda, Russia, Ukraine, Youtube, Tribun Timur.

INTRODUCTION

A number of academic studies, investigative reports, and scientific reviews show that the Russian Federation has systematically carried out disinformation and propaganda campaigns in various countries, including Ukraine (Soares et al., 2023). One factor that strengthens the effectiveness of this strategy is the state's dominance over national media, where almost all information channels are under the control of President Putin's government (Kiriya, 2021). By controlling the flow of domestic information, Russia is able to consistently disseminate certain narratives to shape public perception of the situation in Ukraine. As a result, both Russian citizens and the international community tend to understand the conflict based on

the version constructed by the Russian government rather than objective facts (Karpchuk & Yuskiv, 2021).

This phenomenon is reflected in the findings of various investigative reports, one of which is a Twitter/X report in February 2021 that revealed the involvement of 373 accounts in a coordinated information operation carried out by Russia together with Iran and Armenia (Verrier, 2023). On the other hand, Russian propaganda has also been identified on Indonesian YouTube, as revealed in an investigative report conducted by Narasi, Remotivi, and the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR). Nearly 60% of Tribun Timur's YouTube video content is related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the comment section is dominated by Russian language, indicating the influence of Russian propaganda in the uploaded videos (Narasi, 2023). This fact points to the possibility that external actors, particularly from Russia, are attempting to influence national public opinion.

Furthermore, the digital investigation uncovered activity originating from the city of St. Petersburg, Russia, as well as indications of Russian nationals residing in Bali being involved in the production and dissemination of propaganda content related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Narasi, 2023). One physical indication of this involvement is the increase in the number of Russian citizens visiting Bali from 2022 to early 2023, peaking in January 2023 at 22,703 people (Aprilia, 2023). A number of violations by Russian citizens have also been recorded, ranging from overstaying (Widodo, 2023), three people violating Balinese customs (Wiguna, 2023), illegal business in PARQ Ubud/Russian village (Detikbali, 2024), and traffic violations (Kdf, 2023). Additionally, there is a potential for mafia-like activities, as they attempt to form groups, engage in business, control property, establish networks, and “cultivate relationships” with corrupt officials (Herin, 2025). These facts clarify that, in addition to YouTube Tribun Timur potentially being exploited as a tool for transnational propaganda by Russia, the physical presence of Russian citizens who may be involved in digital propaganda activities in Bali raises new issues related to national security.

In this context, it is important to evaluate the position of local media such as Tribun Timur within Indonesia's digital information ecosystem. According to its official LinkedIn profile in 2025, this media outlet first published on February 9, 2004, in print form. Its headquarters are located in Makassar, South Sulawesi, with its primary circulation area covering two provinces: South Sulawesi and West Sulawesi. Tribun Timur is one of the regional newspapers owned by Kompas Gramedia, managed by PT Indopersda Primamedia (Persda Network), the Regional Newspaper Division of Kompas Gramedia. In its publication process, Kompas Gramedia collaborates with Bosowa Group, a leading national business group based in Makassar. In addition to its print edition, Tribun Timur also has an online portal at [makassar.tribunnews\[.\]com](http://makassar.tribunnews[.]com) and manages various social media accounts such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, TikTok, and a YouTube channel under the name Tribun Timur.

The Tribun Timur YouTube channel at www.youtube.com/@tribuntimur is part of Tribun Timur's social media news channels and one of the most popular media outlets in Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia. Tribun Timur's YouTube channel was established on September 23, 2011, and as of May 29, 2025, it has 9.03 million subscribers, 97,647 uploaded videos, and has been viewed 9,397,732,636 times, and has received various awards for its news coverage. One of these awards was the YouTube Awards 2022 in the category of “The Most Viewed News Channel” or the most-watched news channel, based on evaluations from January to August 2022 (Nurmin, 2022).

This achievement shows that Tribun Timur has successfully competed with other national media outlets on YouTube. However, this award is problematic because most of its uploaded content during the assessment period was dominated by news coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As part of a national media network, Tribun Timur should have focused its coverage on national issues that are relevant to the interests of the Indonesian public.

Furthermore, the intensity of video uploads related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict by Tribun Timur did not cease in 2022 but continued consistently until 2025. This raises suspicions of a hidden agenda, considering that this media outlet is part of a national network that should ideally prioritize domestic issues. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the video content produced and published by the Tribun Timur YouTube channel is crucial to uncovering the suspected hidden agenda and its potential impact on national information security.

METHOD

The approach in this study uses content analysis and literature review methods. Content analysis, according to Weber (1990), is a research method involving a series of procedures to draw conclusions about the message sender, the message itself, or the audience, which can be used to audit the purpose of communication content and detect the presence of propaganda. Additionally, the researcher employs a literature review method to identify, evaluate, and analyze various literature related to the discussed topic. According to Synder (2009), a relevant literature review is essential for all research disciplines and projects because by reading an article, researchers can map and assess the research topic to achieve the research objectives or hypotheses. Thus, the researcher observed each visual scene in the sample video between March and July 2024 and analyzed the scenes in the video. The videos to be analyzed consisted of scene clips, voice-overs, headlines, titles, and video descriptions. The results of the observation were then analyzed, linked to Lee & Lee (1939) propaganda theory, and conclusions were drawn. In this case, the researcher will describe and explain the propaganda packaged by YouTube Tribun Timur regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2024.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Youtube Tribun Timur has uploaded 12,868 videos related to Russia-Ukraine news from February 1, 2022, to June 30, 2025, based on data from Remotivi in 2022, and Social Network Analysis (SNA) exposure data from the Cyclops tool in 2023, 2024, and 2025 with the keywords “Russia” and “Ukraine.”



(Source: Edited by the Author)

Figure 1. Total Videos of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict 2022-2025

As shown in the graph in Figure 1, there was a significant surge in video uploads during the March-July 2024 period, indicated by the blue line. During this period, the details of the uploads are as follows: March 2024 (662 videos), April 2024 (630 videos), May 2024 (771 videos), June 2024 (684 videos), and July 2024 (883 videos).

Additionally, during the March-July 2024 period, there are sample uploads to be analyzed titled “FULL, Russian UAV Lancet Intensively Attacks Positions, Military Vehicles,

and Ukrainian Soldiers,” “Close-Range Firefight Between Russia and Ukraine in Bakhmud, Dozens of Ukrainian Soldiers Flee During an Ambush,” “Full: Dozens of Ukrainian Soldiers Nervously Enter M113 as Russia Sends Projectiles,” “4 Ukrainian Soldiers Caught Red-Handed and Immediately Surrender, Russian Soldiers: The Right Choice!“, ”Heroic Action by Russian Soldiers Attacking Enemy Positions with Motorcycles”, because some of these videos had the highest engagement (views, likes, comments) during that month.

Analysis of the Video Titled "FULL, UAV Lancet Rusia Gempur Habis-habisan Posisi, Kendaraan Militer Hingga Prajurit Ukraina"



(Source: <https://www.youtube.com/@tribuntimur>)

Figure 2. Sample Youtube Tribun Timur Uploads in March 2024

Figure 2 shows the video title “FULL, Russian Lancet UAVs Viciously Attack Positions, Military Vehicles, and Ukrainian Soldiers” accompanied by a thumbnail with the headline "LANCET UAVs GETTING MORE AGGRESSIVE, DESTROY HUNDREDS OF UKRAINIAN EQUIPMENT & SOLDIERS" using an image of Ukrainian soldiers and the Ukrainian flag being targeted. The thumbnail conveys a dramatic and glorified tone regarding Russian military power. Visually, the Ukrainian flag is shown within the drone's attack range, symbolically representing a legitimate target for destruction. This demonstrates a highly strategic visual construction in conveying the superiority of Russian military power.


In the video's narrative, it states: "Since the onset of tensions between Russian infantry and Ukrainian infantry, there have been no signs of peace. Both former Soviet blocs have intensified their retaliatory attacks. As seen in a widely circulated recording on Telegram on Friday, March 8, 2024, the footage shows Russian military personnel updating the record for the number of ammunition rounds used, publicly disclosed in the northern military district. According to the video description, the target was tracked using the ZALA Z-16. According to open-source information, 163 incidents were recorded in February this year. As in the previous month, the list of targets primarily consists of foreign equipment samples or weapons such as the Self-propelled Zuzana 2000 and the RM-70 Vampire MLRS. Additionally, the first recorded defeat of the Patriot air defense missile launcher was noted, among other incidents. Following this success, Vladimir Putin's army dubbed the Lancet drone the “foreign animal hunter.”

The narrative presented in the video reinforces the impression that Russia holds a dominant military position. It is stated that Russia's Lancet UAV has broken records for

ammunition usage and successfully destroyed various Ukrainian heavy weapons such as the RM-70 Vampire and Patriot air defense systems. Moreover, the use of the term “foreign animal hunter” to refer to the attack drone is a form of verbal representation that degrades the Ukrainian side and portrays them in a dehumanizing manner, as if they were merely objects of prey, not human beings.

The propaganda technique employed is the “Name Calling” technique, evident in the use of terms like “foreign animal hunter,” which indirectly discredits Ukrainian soldiers. The Glittering Generalities technique emerges through bombastic phrases like “increasingly brutal,” “devastating attacks,” and “record ammunition usage,” creating a perception of heroism and absolute strength without providing comparative data. Furthermore, the Transfer technique is used through the visualization of the Ukrainian flag in drone footage, associating the image of Ukraine as a whole with an enemy worthy of destruction. Additionally, the Card Stacking technique is evident in the emphasis on facts that only highlight Russian military successes without mentioning their losses. There are also indications of Testimonial, through the statement that “according to open sources, 163 episodes have been registered,” which implies the authority of the information even though it is unverified. Finally, the Bandwagon technique is implicitly built through the mention of the number of episodes and successes, suggesting that Russia has been widely recognized as the winning party.

Analysis of the Video Titled "Baku Tembak Jarak Dekat Rusia VS Ukraina di Bakhmud, Belasan Tentara Ukraina Kabur saat Disergap"



(Source: <https://www.youtube.com/@tribuntimur>)

Figure 3. Sample Youtube Tribun Timur Uploads in April 2024

Figure 3 shows the video title “Close-Range Gunfight Between Russia and Ukraine in Bakhmud, Dozens of Ukrainian Soldiers Flee During Ambush” accompanied by a thumbnail with the headline “RARE MOMENT: 5 RUSSIANS VS 12 UKRAINIANS, RUSSIA VS UKRAINE CLOSE-RANGE GUNFIGHT,” and displays an image of several Ukrainian and Russian soldiers facing off. The title presents a narrative that favors the Russian military. The visual representation in the thumbnail shows a numerical comparison between five Russian soldiers and twelve Ukrainian soldiers, each with their respective national flags, accompanied by the dramatic text “Rare Moment: 5 Russians vs. 12 Ukrainians” and “Close-Range Firefight.” This visual construction aims to highlight Russia's tactical superiority, despite being outnumbered.


The video's narrative states: "On Thursday, April 4, 2024, a video went viral on the Telegram social media platform, showing dozens of Ukrainian soldiers fleeing in disarray as Russian troops stormed their base on the northern side of Bakhmut. The video, uploaded by

military news with the caption, shows a successful attack on Ukrainian fortifications along the Verbovoye excavation route on the northern side of Bakhmut. The surviving Ukrainian soldiers hurriedly abandoned their positions under fire. Not only that, Ukrainian soldiers attempting to fight back from behind trenches were immediately subjected to machine gun fire and grenade bombs. At the end of the video, it shows how Russian military forces unleashed a barrage of missiles toward Ukrainian military positions attempting to resist. The number of casualties in this close-range firefight is unknown, but as seen in the video, Ukraine was decisively defeated by the military.

The narrative presented in the video titled “Close-Range Firefight Between Russia and Ukraine in Bakhmut” explicitly showcases a discourse construction favoring Russian military superiority through hyperbolic language such as “scattered,” “immediately fired upon,” and “barrage of missiles.” This narrative contains a dominant pattern of reinforcing Russia's offensive image and weakening Ukraine's image by ignoring the opposing context. The use of terms such as “ukronasis” indicates ideological content and an attempt to dehumanize the Ukrainian army.

The propaganda technique used, such as Name Calling, is evident in the use of the pejorative term “ukronasis” to refer to Ukrainian soldiers, aiming to dehumanize and ideologically stigmatize the enemy. Glittering Generalities are employed through phrases like “rare moment,” “in disarray,” and “defeated decisively,” which carry emotional and heroic connotations but lack objective data support. Card Stacking is also strongly present, as only Russian military successes are highlighted without balanced information on losses or broader context. The Transfer technique appears through the placement of the Ukrainian flag on the heads of kneeling or surrendering soldiers, creating an association of defeat with the Ukrainian national symbol. Additionally, the Bandwagon technique is used by stating that the video is “viral on Telegram,” giving the impression that the narrative presented has gained widespread public legitimacy.

Analysis of the Video Titled "Full Puluhan Tentara Ukraina Ketar-Ketir Masuk M113 saat Rusia Kirim Sedangan Proyektil"



(Source: <https://www.youtube.com/@tribuntimur>)

Figure 4. Sample Youtube Tribun Timur Uploads in May 2024

Figure 4 shows the video title “Full Dozens of Ukrainian Soldiers Tremble as They Enter M113s as Russia Sends Projectiles.” An analysis of the video title explicitly shows military events in the Russia-Ukraine conflict with a dramatized narrative and symbolic significance. Additionally, the thumbnail states, “A Single Russian Soldier Eliminates

Ukrainian Forces in Armored Vehicles,” accompanied by visual elements such as arrows and the caption “Fully Loaded with Ukrainian Forces,” conveying a sense of tension, fear, and pressure for the Ukrainian side.


The video's narrative states, “This is footage of dozens of Ukrainian soldiers nervously entering their armored personnel carriers, playing cat and mouse with Russian projectiles that keep coming.” The footage was shared on Sunday, May 5, 2024. The post's description states that Ukrainian soldiers decided to enter the M113 armored personnel carrier and abandon their positions under intense Russian fire. Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to fire from all directions. After two projectile strikes and grenade launcher fire, the Ukrainian soldiers still did not abandon their intention to board the armored personnel carrier and were wounded as a result of the Russian attack. The footage sparked various comments from netizens.

The narrative in the video emphasizes that the Ukrainian soldiers were in a state of “trembling fear” facing the Russian projectile barrage, described as “cat and mouse,” a term implying inferiority and panic. Meanwhile, one Russian soldier is portrayed as a lone hero capable of blocking and destroying the armored vehicle filled with Ukrainian troops. This narrative structurally highlights the extreme contrast between the brave individual (the Russian soldier) and the helpless group (the Ukrainian soldiers), reinforcing the dichotomy of courage versus fear.

The propaganda technique used in the video is Glittering Generalities, marked by phrases such as “single-handedly destroyed” and “trembling,” which have an emotional effect on the narrative but lack factual evidence. This technique manipulates the audience's emotions to admire the Russian side and belittle the opponent. Second, the Name Calling technique appears implicitly through the portrayal of Ukrainian soldiers as “playing cat and mouse,” which depicts them as cowards and incapable of taking initiative. Third, Card Stacking is used by only presenting the successes of the Russian side and ignoring the losses or negative impacts of the battle on the other side, including civilian casualties or possible civilian damage.

Furthermore, the visualization of Russian soldiers alone facing tanks full of Ukrainian troops can be interpreted as a form of Transfer, because there is a value of courage and heroism by Russia through the symbol of impressive single action. This technique reinforces the impression that Russia is a symbol of courage and military effectiveness. In addition, the use of viral narratives and claims that the video was widely discussed by netizens is an implicit form of the Bandwagon technique, which shapes the perception that the narrative has become the majority opinion and is worth following.

Analysis of the Video Titled "4 Tentara Ukraina Tertangkap Basah dan Langsung Serahkan Diri, Tentara Rusia: Pilihan yang Tepat!"



(Source: <https://www.youtube.com/@tribuntimur>)

Figure 5. Sample Youtube Tribun Timur Uploads in June 2024

Figure 5 shows the title of the video “4 Ukrainian Soldiers Caught Red-Handed and Immediately Surrendered, Russian Soldiers: The Right Choice!” which depicts the surrender of a number of Ukrainian soldiers to a Russian soldier in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. The thumbnail includes a headline reading “A SINGLE RUSSIAN SOLDIER CAPTURES 4 UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS WHO WERE CHATTING,” accompanied by an image of several Ukrainian soldiers raising their hands, emphasizing that Russian soldiers possess extraordinary capabilities, even when acting alone, while the Ukrainian soldiers are depicted as being careless, unprofessional, and even undisciplined, as they are described as “chatting.”

The video's narrative states, “Misfortune once again does not favor the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During frontline combat, Russian special forces captured four Ukrainian military officers simultaneously inside a trench. The footage has been widely circulating on the Telegram social media platform on Monday, May 17, 2024. Russian fighters claim they are not afraid of anything. Therefore, a special forces soldier from the same region went to the trench where they were hiding and captured all their enemies there. Some Ukrainian soldiers made the right decision by hiding in front of the Russian troops. Furthermore, their lives can be assured to be safe based on the Russian soldiers' claims.

The video's narrative demonstrates a highly selective and biased representation, with a primary focus on Russia's moral and military victories. The narrative begins with the phrase “misfortune once again does not favor the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” which reinforces the theme of Ukraine's weakness. The narrator then describes the heroic success of Russian special forces through phrases like “fearless,” “going into the trenches,” and “capturing all their enemies,” positioning Russia as a superior force both individually and tactically. In addition, the use of the phrase “making the right decision by hiding” suggests justification for Ukraine's helplessness, reinforcing the framing that surrender is the only rational option in the face of Russian dominance. This type of narrative structure represents a symbolic attempt to shape public opinion by simplifying the complexity of the conflict and attaching an absolute image to Russian power.

This video employs several propaganda techniques, including implicit name-calling by portraying Ukrainian soldiers as careless, resigned, and unprofessional. The mention that they were caught “chatting” creates a negative perception of the discipline of the Ukrainian military. Second, Glittering Generalities appear in phrases such as “the right choice,” “fearless,” and “luck is not on our side,” which create a dramatic impression but lack factual verification. Third, Card Stacking is evident in the narrative that only presents Russia's success in capturing the enemy without explaining the broader context, such as the actual battle situation, possible prior resistance, or tactical reasons behind the surrender.

Transfer techniques are also seen through the visualization of surrender and the symbolization of the Ukrainian flag placed above the heads of the surrendering soldiers. This reinforces the association that Ukraine as a whole is associated with defeat and weakness. Additionally, the Testimonial technique is evident in the statement that “Russian soldiers claim their lives will be safe,” as if to imply that Russia is not only superior in strength but also morally superior. This claim is not verified by neutral or third-party sources. As for the Plain Folks and Bandwagon techniques, they are not as prominent in this video, though the overall tone of the narrative remains focused on normalizing Ukraine's surrender as a routine and ordinary event.

Analysis of the Video Titled "Aksi Heroik Tentara Rusia Serang Posisi Musuh dengan Sepeda Motor"



(Source: <https://www.youtube.com/@tribuntimur>)

Figure 6. Sample Youtube Tribun Timur Uploads in July 2024

Figure 6 shows the title of the video “Heroic Action of Russian Soldiers Attacking Enemy Positions on Motorcycles.” The video title presents visuals and narration depicting the success of Russian forces in attacking Ukrainian territory, particularly in the village of Staromayorskoye. Meanwhile, the thumbnail content features a headline reading “RUSSIAN MILITARY ATTACKS UKRAINIAN TROOPS IN STAROMAYORSKOE,” accompanied by an image of several Russian soldiers riding motorcycles and walking on foot. The video thumbnail features two main parts: an image of several Russian soldiers riding motorcycles and another showing them moving on land. This combination of visuals and text explicitly constructs an offensive narrative emphasizing that Russia is the dominant actor in this conflict.

The video is accompanied by an audio narration: "A video has been widely circulating on the Telegram social media platform on Wednesday, July 3, 2024. The recording shows scenes of Russian military forces conducting an attack using motorcycles. Russian soldiers describe how they seized Ukrainian positions in the Staromayorskoye area. During the liberation of the village of Staromayorskoye and the occupation of the enemy's large fortress in the Ugleder direction, the assault unit of the Primorye combined-arms formation from the Vostok military group actively used motorized vehicles. Military personnel from the assault detachment used motorcycles to carry out offensive operations, transporting ammunition and food to the occupied fortress. As seen in the footage, the intense back-and-forth fighting between the two sides continued. By the time this video circulated, various comments were posted by netizens.

The propaganda technique used in the video is Glittering Generalities, evident in phrases such as “heroic actions,” “training properly,” “acting bravely and boldly,” and “everything is fine.” These expressions create the perception that Russia is not only technically superior but also morally and strategically superior. The Testimonial technique is also evident in the form of direct narratives from Russian soldiers explaining their planning and training processes in detail, aiming to create an authentic and trustworthy impression on the audience. This technique builds personal and institutional credibility. The Transfer Technique occurs

through the portrayal of the Russian military as a systematic, well-trained, and innovative force—a transfer of positive values of efficiency and courage to the Russian military institution as a whole. The Card Stacking technique is used by highlighting all the tactical advantages of Russia, such as the use of drones, motorcycles, and simulation training, without showing the serious consequences or challenges of such operations. There is no mention of significant losses or resistance from the Ukrainian side, which clearly indicates the omission of counter-narrative information.

Youtube Tribun Timur as Propaganda Tool

The narrative presented by Youtube Tribun Timur in the fifth sample of videos in the March-July 2024 period shows that its uploads often highlight the superiority of a certain party (Russia), which can be categorized as propaganda. Propaganda itself can weaken an individual's critical thinking skills because public opinion is accepted as personal truth and reinforced by the mass media through emotional and sensational content (Coman, et al. 2021).

At the international level, indications of Russia's involvement in spreading pro-Russian narratives through foreign media platforms (Tribun Timur) show how cross-border propaganda can influence public opinion. Furthermore, the pattern of propaganda that has successfully entered Indonesian national media could set a precedent for other countries to replicate similar strategies in other issues, whether for geopolitical, economic, or ideological interests. Other countries may view the hundreds of YouTube posts by Tribun Timur per month related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which present unbalanced information, as a Russian success that could be exploited to infiltrate their narratives into Indonesia's domestic information space, particularly where editorial verification is minimal. Additionally, there is a risk of disinformation from other countries that could misinterpret the intent of Tribun Timur's YouTube uploads related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which could be perceived as representing Indonesia's political stance in support of Russia in the conflict.

The propaganda model employed by Russia has been studied by Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews in their journal article titled *The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model*, characterizing Russia's contemporary propaganda model as “the firehose of falsehood” with the following distinctive features: (1) High volume and multi-channel, (2) Fast, continuous, and repetitive, (3) Lack of commitment to objective reality, and (4) Lack of commitment to consistency, which is effective in influencing psychological science because people are often cognitively lazy in verifying excess information (especially on the Internet), and people are often poor at distinguishing true information from false information (Paul & Matthews, 2008). The model proposed by Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews reflects the video uploads made by YouTube Tribun Timur during the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The similarities between the characteristics of YouTube Tribun Timur's video uploads related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the model proposed by Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews suggest that YouTube Tribun Timur may have the same pattern used in Russian operations that utilize online media platforms for Russian interests. This can be compared to the Euvsdisinfo report (2024) that EEAS Stratcom has detected Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activities by the media outlet RRN[.]world (Recent Reliable News), which actively promotes Russian narratives to disrupt and interfere with electoral processes, particularly targeting audiences in France and Germany, with additional content published in Polish, Italian, and Spanish.

The exposure of Tribun Timur media through the Tribun Timur YouTube channel, which indirectly disseminates foreign propaganda narratives, highlights serious vulnerabilities in the domestic information resilience system. Tribun Timur's YouTube channel, which as of 2025 continues to intensively upload videos of the Russia-Ukraine conflict with a pro-Russian bias, has the potential to become a foreign propaganda channel with a wide reach in Eastern

Indonesia, nationally, and even internationally. If this pattern is not identified and analyzed seriously, foreign actors such as Russia could use Indonesian national media as a propaganda channel for geopolitical interests. The impact of propaganda utilizing social media can be seen in the case of democratic intervention in the 2016 US presidential election, which showed the role of the Internet Research Agency (IRA) in spreading propaganda for Donald Trump's victory (Jacobson, et al., 2019).

CONCLUSION

Youtube Tribun Timur has uploaded 12,868 videos related to Russia-Ukraine news coverage from February 1, 2022 to June 30, 2025. Based on the facts and analysis presented in this article, YouTube Tribun Timur has engaged in propaganda regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This is evident in a sample of five videos with the highest engagement each month during the period from March to July 2024, which demonstrate a consistent and structured narrative pattern in constructing a dominant image of Russia's military strength. Through a combination of visuals, verbal narratives, and national symbols, the content is constructed to reinforce the public perception that Russia is a superior, professional, and heroic power, while Ukraine is portrayed as weak, panicked, and defeated. Using Weber's (1990) content analysis approach, recurring patterns were identified, including the use of flag symbols, hyperbolic phrases, and the omission of countering information, indicating a deliberate framing process. In the context of Lee & Lee's (1939) propaganda techniques, all videos systematically employ strategies such as Glittering Generalities, Card Stacking, Name Calling, Transfer, Testimonial, and Bandwagon to influence public opinion. These findings underscore that content appearing as war coverage has been communicatively engineered as a form of covert digital propaganda. Additionally, the analysis results indicate the use of repetitive messages (Russia's success, Ukraine's failure) and strong symbols (Putin as a superior figure, Ukraine/NATO as a common enemy). As a result of this propaganda, there are indications that Russian parties are involved in influencing Indonesian public opinion for specific interests, such as Russia's involvement in Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

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