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Legal Protection of BP Batam Port Assets from the Perspective of the Security Directorate

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Abstract: This article examines the legal protection of BP Batam's port assets from the perspective of the Security Directorate (Ditpam), focusing on civil liability, administrative safeguards, and coordination. Batam's port infrastructure forms part of a strategic free-port regime and therefore constitutes state assets essential to logistics, investment, and connectivity. The study asks how the legal status of those assets is constructed, how Ditpam functions within the institutional framework, and what legal remedies are available when assets are damaged, occupied, misused, or exposed to governance failures. The research employs a normative juridical method based on statutory, conceptual, and institutional analysis, supported by official reports and relevant empirical materials. The analysis shows that BP Batam's port assets enjoy a relatively strong legal foundation because they form part of state property managed under a special regulatory regime. Nevertheless, effective protection depends not only on formal ownership status but also on security supervision, orderly land administration, lawful asset utilization, and timely coordination with other authorities. The article concludes that legal protection will remain incomplete unless regulatory clarity, institutional capacity, and governance accountability are strengthened simultaneously.

Keyword: Legal Protecion, Port Assets, Security Directorate, BP Batam, Civil Liability

INTRODUCTION

Batam occupies a distinctive legal and economic position in Indonesia. As a free trade and free port area, it functions not merely as a local industrial city but as a strategic node in regional shipping, logistics, manufacturing, and cross-border investment. Within that framework, port facilities such as Batu Ampar and other supporting terminals perform a public and commercial function at once: they facilitate the movement of goods, support industrial production, attract investors, and strengthen Indonesia's connectivity with international markets. Because of this dual function, port assets in Batam cannot be understood solely as ordinary physical infrastructure. They are strategic state assets whose protection directly affects trade efficiency, investment confidence, fiscal value, and public order. When legal uncertainty,

unlawful occupation, asset misuse, or weak security governance affects those assets, the consequences extend beyond the operator and reach the wider regional economy.

The legal position of BP Batam is central to this discussion. BP Batam was established under Government Regulation No. 46 of 2007 and later reinforced through subsequent amendments as the authority responsible for managing, developing, and operating the Batam free trade and free port area. This mandate places BP Batam in control of extensive land, port, airport, and supporting infrastructure assets. In practical terms, BP Batam does not merely administer facilities; it bears responsibility for ensuring that those facilities remain legally secure, physically protected, and administratively orderly. In the port sector, this responsibility intersects with the shipping regime under Law No. 17 of 2008 and Government Regulation No. 61 of 2009 as amended by Government Regulation No. 64 of 2015. As a result, the legal protection of port assets is shaped by overlapping norms on state property, land management, port administration and investment facilitation.

The complexity of the issue lies in the fact that asset protection in a port environment is never limited to questions of formal ownership. A port is an active operational space characterized by the constant movement of vessels, cargo, vehicles, workers, service providers, and state authorities. Its assets include land under management rights, wharves, access roads, warehouses, security installations, utilities, loading equipment, and other supporting facilities. Each element is vulnerable to legal and factual threats, including unauthorized use of land, encroachment, theft, vandalism, unlawful extraction of natural resources in buffer areas, and the use of port channels for illicit activities. In Batam, these risks are intensified by the area's border position and the scale of assets under BP Batam's authority. Accordingly, legal protection must be approached as a combination of preventive governance, administrative discipline, civil liability, and coordinated law enforcement.

BP Batam has attempted to respond to those risks through institutional mechanisms, one of which is the Security Directorate, commonly referred to as Ditpam. This unit performs a frontline role in patrol, access control, monitoring of strategic facilities, prevention of unlawful occupation, and operational coordination with other agencies. In practice, Ditpam functions as the internal guardian of BP Batam's asset regime. Yet its role is structurally limited. It is not a general criminal law enforcement body and therefore cannot independently replace the functions of the police, maritime authorities, land agencies, or prosecutors. Its effectiveness depends on how clearly its authority is formulated, how consistently it works within internal procedures, how well it documents security incidents, and how effectively it coordinates with other institutions when a threat evolves into a dispute or a criminal matter. This institutional position raises an important legal question: to what extent can the protection of strategic port assets rely on an internal security directorate whose authority is preventive and supervisory rather than coercive in the criminal justice sense?

A second issue concerns the legal consequences of harm to port assets. When a third-party damages infrastructure, occupies land without authorization, diverts use rights, or interferes with port facilities in a manner that causes loss, the problem is not only administrative but also civil. Indonesian private law, particularly Article 1365 of the Civil Code, provides a doctrinal basis for liability arising from unlawful acts. This provision is highly relevant in the context of port asset protection because it allows losses caused by unlawful conduct to be framed in terms of compensation and legal accountability. At the same time, the principle also works in the opposite direction. BP Batam itself, as a public body, may face claims if it acts unlawfully in allocating, controlling, or securing assets. The discussion therefore cannot be reduced to protecting the institution against outsiders; it must also address the obligation of the institution to exercise authority lawfully, proportionately, and accountably.

This article is important because practical discourse on BP Batam's assets often emphasizes utilization and development, while the legal architecture of protection receives less

systematic attention. Studies and institutional reports have discussed land certification, asset optimization, port development, and security cooperation, but these themes are rarely integrated into a single legal analysis centered on the Security Directorate as a focal point of institutional protection. There is therefore a gap between formal regulation and operational governance: the rules are dispersed across public law, port law, land management, and civil liability doctrines, whereas the practical vulnerabilities emerge in one integrated operational field. This article seeks to bridge that gap by examining legal status, institutional role, liability doctrine, coordination problems, and regulatory reform within one analytical framework.

Based on that background, this study addresses the following core problem: how should the legal protection of BP Batam's port assets be understood and strengthened from the perspective of the Security Directorate? To answer that question, the article is structured around five issues: the legal status of port assets as state property; the legal and factual role of Ditpam; civil liability under Article 1365 of the Civil Code; coordination and institutional obstacles; and the need for legal strengthening and governance reform. By clarifying those dimensions, this article aims to contribute not only to doctrinal legal debate but also to policy improvement in the management of strategic port assets in Batam.

METHOD

This study employs a normative juridical method. The primary object of analysis is positive law governing BP Batam, port administration, state asset management, land control, and civil liability, especially Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code. The study uses a statutory approach to examine legislation relevant to Batam's free trade zone status, port governance, and state asset administration; a conceptual approach to assess legal protection, accountability, and unlawful acts; and a limited institutional approach through official reports, policy documents, and publicly available records concerning BP Batam's security practices. Primary legal materials include Law No. 17 of 2008 on Shipping, Government Regulation No. 46 of 2007, Government Regulation No. 61 of 2009, Government Regulation No. 27 of 2014, Government Regulation No. 41 of 2021, and Minister of Finance Regulation No. 59 of 2020. Secondary materials consist of scholarly articles, audit reports, institutional publications, and relevant media reports used as contextual support. The materials were collected through literature review and document study, then analyzed qualitatively through legal interpretation, systematic comparison of norms, and reasoned legal argumentation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Legal Status of BP Batam Port Assets

The first point that must be clarified is the legal status of BP Batam's port assets. Their protection depends on whether they are legally recognized, properly administered, and institutionally attributable to a public authority. In the Batam context, the status is relatively clear: the main port facilities and their supporting land fall within the regime of state property managed by BP Batam as the authority of the Batam free trade and free port area. This status is crucial because it means that port assets are protected not only as productive infrastructure but also as public assets whose use, control, transfer, and security are governed by public law principles. Once an asset is recognized as part of state property, its protection is linked to inventory discipline, legal title, controlled utilization, and accountability for any loss or impairment.

It confirms that BP Batam acts as the institutional user and manager of state assets rather than as a private holder of property rights. Consequently, BP Batam's authority is accompanied by duties of maintenance, supervision, and legal safeguarding. The status places port assets within the state asset management regime under Government Regulation No. 27 of 2014 and its implementing instruments. These rules require public institutions to ensure orderly

administration, documentation, valuation, use, and security of state property. the classification of these assets as strategic infrastructure means that any damage, encroachment, or unlawful use may generate public consequences, including disruption of port services, investment uncertainty, and loss to the state.

Land occupies a particularly important place in this structure. Much of the land in Batam operates under a management rights regime administered by BP Batam. In practice, that regime gives BP Batam an essential legal platform for allocating use, supervising occupation, and preventing unlawful control by third parties. For port assets, secure land administration is not a peripheral matter. It is the foundation of legal protection because disputes over occupation, use rights, boundaries, and authority often begin with weaknesses in land records or in the enforcement of land control. Land certification and orderly registration therefore function as preventive legal safeguards. They reduce the risk of overlapping claims, strengthen evidentiary certainty, and support more effective action when an encroachment or dispute arises.

The same logic applies to non-land assets. Wharves, warehouses, loading equipment, utility installations, and security facilities are part of the broader state asset structure and must be protected through inventory systems, operational procedures, and legal documentation. If those assets are poorly recorded or loosely supervised, the institution's legal position becomes weaker when damage or misuse occurs. A clear legal status, by contrast, enables BP Batam to demonstrate control, quantify loss, and justify enforcement or civil action. In this sense, legal protection is inseparable from administrative order. Assets that are not legally and administratively visible are inherently more vulnerable.

The port sector adds another layer of legal significance. Under the shipping regime, port operators are not expected merely to provide business services; they must also maintain safe and orderly facilities. Thus, the legal protection of BP Batam's port assets is linked to the continuity of public transportation and logistics functions. The unlawful occupation of a port access area, damage to loading facilities, or manipulation of supporting land rights may impair not only BP Batam's institutional interests but also shipping efficiency and public economic interests. This gives port asset protection a hybrid character: it is a matter of state property law, administrative legality, and functional public service protection.

For that reason, the legal status of BP Batam's port assets should be understood as the first layer of protection, not the final answer. A strong status establishes entitlement and responsibility, but it does not automatically secure the assets against interference. The transition from formal legal status to effective protection requires active institutional control, accurate land and asset administration, and the capacity to respond when rights are violated. The importance of Ditpam emerges precisely at that point, as the institution tasked with translating formal legal status into operational protection.

The Legal and Institutional Role of the Security Directorate

The Security Directorate is the internal institutional mechanism through which BP Batam seeks to operationalize asset protection. Its role should be read in both legal and functional terms. Legally, Ditpam derives its position from BP Batam's organizational authority to maintain order and security over assets under its control. Functionally, it performs surveillance, patrol, access control, incident response, monitoring of strategic facilities, and coordination with external authorities. Its importance lies in the fact that legal protection of assets is rarely achieved through litigation alone. Before disputes mature into lawsuits or criminal cases, they usually appear as operational vulnerabilities: suspicious activity, unauthorized access, informal occupation, deterioration of security barriers, or escalating conflicts around land and port space. Ditpam operates at that preventive stage.

In port areas, this preventive function is especially important because the environment is highly dynamic. A port cannot be guarded effectively through static administrative measures

only. It requires regular physical presence, rapid identification of irregularities, control of entry and exit points, and monitoring of operational zones that may be exposed to theft, vandalism, unlawful use, or infiltration by illicit logistics networks. Ditpam's practical contribution therefore lies in preserving the factual control that supports legal control. When an institution loses factual control over its assets, legal protection becomes more difficult to enforce. Evidence weakens, damage becomes harder to trace, and the distinction between authorized and unauthorized use may become blurred.

Ditpam also performs an evidentiary function, even if this is not always emphasized in institutional discourse. Security units generate reports, incident records, patrol findings, and field documentation that may later become relevant for administrative sanctions, civil claims, or criminal referrals. In this sense, the directorate contributes not only to prevention but also to the legal defensibility of BP Batam's position. A well-documented security incident provides the basis for demonstrating that an asset was under institutional control, that a disturbance occurred, and that the institution responded within its authority. Without such documentation, later legal action may become weaker or more vulnerable to challenge.

At the same time, Ditpam's role is constrained. It does not possess unlimited coercive power. It cannot simply substitute for the police, prosecutors, maritime authorities, or the land agency. Its authority is strongest in prevention, supervision, reporting, and internal enforcement of institutional control. Once a matter involves criminal investigation, prosecution, formal land adjudication, or judicial enforcement, coordination with external institutions becomes necessary. This reflects the basic architecture of public authority. However, it means that Ditpam's effectiveness depends heavily on the clarity of institutional boundaries and the quality of inter-agency cooperation.

A further issue is legitimacy. Internal security actions in public economic spaces can generate friction if they are not grounded in transparent procedures. Asset protection may involve controlling access, removing unauthorized activity, supporting eviction from state-controlled land, or monitoring operational zones used by private actors. These functions are legally sensitive because they affect third parties. If Ditpam acts without clear internal standards, adequate documentation, or proper coordination, the institution may be accused of arbitrariness, abuse of power, or procedural unfairness. Thus, the directorate's effectiveness is inseparable from its legal discipline. Security action must be lawful, proportionate, and procedurally accountable if it is to strengthen, rather than undermine, the legitimacy of BP Batam's asset protection regime.

For this reason, Ditpam should be understood not as a substitute for the legal system but as a bridge between formal legal norms and operational control. It occupies the institutional space where asset law becomes daily practice. The stronger its procedures, documentation, training, and coordination, the more effective the legal protection of port assets becomes. The weaker those elements are, the more likely it is that formal legal status will remain disconnected from practical security.

Civil Liability and Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code

A central legal instrument for assessing harm to port assets is Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code, which provides the general basis for liability arising from unlawful acts. The provision states, in essence, that any unlawful act causing loss to another person obliges the wrongdoer to compensate for that loss. In the context of BP Batam's port assets, this rule is highly relevant because it supplies a civil law pathway for addressing damage, unauthorized occupation, and other forms of interference that cause measurable loss. While criminal law may be necessary in serious cases, civil liability plays a distinct role: it focuses on restoration, compensation, and the legal accountability of parties whose conduct harms strategic assets.

The first scenario is straightforward. If a third party unlawfully damages port infrastructure, occupies controlled land without authorization, removes or destroys security installations, or otherwise interferes with port assets in a manner that causes loss, BP Batam may frame the matter as an unlawful act under Article 1365. To do so successfully, it must establish the general elements of unlawful conduct, fault, loss, and causal relationship. Here, administrative order again becomes important. BP Batam must be able to show that the asset belonged to the state, that it was under BP Batam's lawful control, that a specific act occurred, and that identifiable loss followed. The role of Ditpam and other internal units is critical because they often produce the factual record needed to support those elements.

In asset-related disputes, compensable loss may take several forms. The most obvious is material damage, such as the cost of repairing a damaged port facility, replacing stolen equipment, restoring fencing, or recovering the use of occupied land. Yet the loss may also include broader operational consequences. Damage to a loading area or prolonged unlawful occupation of a port-supporting site may disrupt logistics flows, delay services, reduce utilization value, or undermine contractual arrangements with port users. Although such losses may be more difficult to quantify, they remain legally significant. A sound protection strategy therefore requires BP Batam not only to secure assets physically but also to maintain the records needed to prove loss when litigation becomes necessary.

The second scenario is more institutionally sensitive: liability on the part of BP Batam itself. Public bodies are not immune from unlawful act claims merely because they exercise public authority. If BP Batam acts in a manner contrary to law, abuses discretion, neglects a legal duty, or causes loss through arbitrary asset control, civil liability may also arise. This possibility is important because legal protection must be reciprocal. The law protects BP Batam's assets against outsiders, but it also protects affected parties against unlawful conduct by the institution. For example, if asset control, land allocation, security intervention, or contract termination were handled in a way that violated legal norms and caused measurable loss, BP Batam could face claims grounded in the doctrine of unlawful acts by public authorities.

This dual direction of Article 1365 is normatively valuable. It encourages balance. On the one hand, it deters third parties from treating strategic public assets as legally vulnerable or weakly protected. On the other hand, it reminds BP Batam that asset protection must remain within lawful limits. The institution cannot justify unlawful conduct merely by invoking security or asset control. From a governance perspective, this is crucial because overly aggressive, poorly documented, or procedurally defective asset enforcement may expose the institution to new disputes while claiming to prevent others.

The doctrine also extends to contractors, service providers, or officials whose negligent performance causes loss. Port assets are often built, maintained, upgraded, or monitored through a chain of institutional and contractual actors. If a contractor performs defective work that damages infrastructure, if a service provider compromises security procedures, or if an official acts negligently in a way that leads to loss, liability analysis may move beyond simple outsider interference. Contractual liability, tort liability, and institutional accountability may overlap. BP Batam therefore needs a legal risk framework that is broader than pure external defense. Asset protection includes risk allocation in procurement, supervision of contractors, and accountability for internal negligence.

Viewed from this angle, Article 1365 does more than provide a litigation basis. It functions as a governance norm. It urges institutions to identify foreseeable harms, document incidents properly, maintain lawful procedures, and allocate responsibility clearly. If those steps are neglected, recovery becomes harder and institutional exposure increases. Thus, civil liability should be read as one pillar of port asset protection: not merely a remedy after damage occurs, but a doctrinal incentive for lawful, orderly, and accountable asset governance.

Coordination Problems and Institutional Obstacles

Even when the legal basis of asset protection appears strong, implementation may be weakened by coordination failures. This is one of the most persistent problems in Batam. Port asset protection lies at the intersection of multiple authorities: BP Batam as the free trade zone authority and asset manager; the Ministry of Transportation and port-related regulators; the police and military for security support; the land agency for certification and land administration; the prosecutor's office for state legal assistance; and the Batam municipal government for local governance and public order issues. Each institution has a rational mandate of its own, but their mandates do not always align neatly in practice.

Historically, Batam has often experienced tensions linked to dual authority between central and local governance structures. Even after institutional adjustments, overlaps in perspective remain. BP Batam tends to prioritize orderly asset utilization, infrastructure development, and investment facilitation. Local government actors may be more immediately responsive to social pressures, settlement issues, public order concerns, and political contestation on the ground. When disputes involve land near strategic assets, access roads, relocation questions, or contested public space, those differences can complicate asset protection. Security action that is legally justified from the standpoint of state asset control may become politically sensitive when it affects communities or local interests.

Coordination problems are not limited to political sensitivity. They also appear in regulatory structure. Port governance in Batam involves a special area regime that does not fully eliminate the relevance of national shipping law and central administrative supervision. This can create ambiguity about operational boundaries, especially when licensing, facility control, security incidents, or enforcement questions arise. Recent policy developments have aimed to simplify those overlaps, but simplification on paper does not immediately remove institutional friction. In practice, effective protection still depends on whether agencies share information promptly, recognize each other's roles, and act within agreed procedures.

From the perspective of Ditpam, these problems are particularly consequential. Because the directorate does not possess full coercive authority, it relies on timely external response when a matter exceeds preventive supervision and enters the domain of formal enforcement. If police assistance is delayed, land documentation is incomplete, or institutional leadership is uncertain, the protective chain weakens. Strategic assets are most vulnerable in precisely such moments of uncertainty. Unauthorized occupation can harden into prolonged control, operational disturbance can continue, and legal disputes can become more difficult to resolve.

Institutional capacity also remains a practical obstacle. Protecting large and dispersed strategic assets requires adequate personnel, training, infrastructure, surveillance systems, and internal reporting discipline. If coverage is thin, if incidents are poorly documented, or if information flows remain fragmented, legal protection becomes reactive rather than preventive. Port environments intensify this challenge because activity is continuous and risks evolve quickly. A security directorate must combine routine monitoring with targeted response, yet this requires resources and institutional support that may not always be sufficient.

The broader consequence is that legal protection may appear robust in legislation but fragile in execution. Formal authority, by itself, cannot overcome fragmented governance. Effective protection requires synchronized roles, clear escalation pathways, reliable data, and an institutional culture of cooperation. Without those elements, even a strategically important asset regime can remain exposed to recurrent interference, delayed enforcement, and avoidable disputes.

The Need for Legal Strengthening and Governance Reform

The preceding analysis suggests that the protection of BP Batam's port assets should not be treated as a purely security problem or a purely administrative one. It is a governance issue that requires legal strengthening at multiple levels. The first need is regulatory clarity within BP Batam's own institutional framework. Internal rules governing security procedures, incident documentation, coordination pathways, and asset protection standards should be explicit, consistent, and operationally usable. This is important not only to improve day-to-day effectiveness but also to strengthen legal legitimacy. When a security directorate acts within clear written procedures, its actions are easier to defend and less vulnerable to accusations of arbitrariness.

The second need concerns state asset administration. Port asset protection will remain incomplete if land records, utilization agreements, certifications, and asset inventories are not kept in a disciplined and integrated manner. Legal title and administrative order are not merely background matters; they are conditions of enforceability. In disputes over control or loss, the institution's legal position is strongest when it can demonstrate clear documentation of rights, boundaries, use arrangements, and asset value. For this reason, reforms in asset governance should prioritize digital inventory systems, stronger integration between physical security and administrative records, and regular internal audit of strategic asset status.

Third, inter-agency coordination should be transformed from an ad hoc response pattern into a more stable institutional mechanism. Memoranda of understanding with law enforcement agencies are useful, but they should be supported by concrete operational procedures: who responds first, how evidence is secured, how incidents are categorized, when a civil pathway is pursued, and when criminal law intervention becomes necessary. Similar clarity is needed in relation to land authorities and local government. Coordination should not wait until conflict erupts. Regular forums, shared protocols, and periodic review of problem areas would help convert fragmented authority into collaborative protection.

Fourth, the capacity and legitimacy of Ditpam itself should be strengthened. This includes not only personnel numbers and infrastructure but also legal literacy, documentation skills, conflict handling, and procedural discipline. Security in a strategic port environment requires more than physical presence. It requires the ability to identify legally significant incidents, preserve evidence, avoid procedural excess, and support later civil or administrative action. If the directorate's professional capacity is improved, the quality of institutional response will also improve.

A fifth need is governance accountability. Legal protection of public assets loses credibility when the institution responsible for protection faces allegations of weak internal control, opaque asset utilization, or procurement irregularities. Good governance is therefore not separate from security; it is part of legal protection itself. The more transparent and accountable BP Batam is in managing strategic assets, the stronger its position becomes when it claims legal protection against external interference. Conversely, where governance weaknesses persist, the institution's authority is easier to challenge and its protective actions may be interpreted through the lens of distrust.

Finally, Batam's geopolitical and economic position makes reform more urgent. As a border-adjacent logistics hub, Batam's port assets are not only commercial instruments but also part of the state's strategic infrastructure. Weak protection can facilitate illicit trade, damage investment confidence, and undermine broader public interests. Stronger legal architecture and governance reform should therefore be seen as long-term institutional investment. They support not only BP Batam's control over assets but also the reliability of Batam as a secure and competitive port environment.

In sum, legal strengthening should move in parallel across rules, records, institutions, coordination, and accountability. If reform addresses only one dimension, protection will

remain partial. A sustainable framework requires formal legality, operational capability, and governance integrity to reinforce one another.

CONCLUSION

The legal protection of BP Batam's port assets rests on a relatively solid normative foundation. Those assets form part of state property managed within the special regime of the Batam free trade and free port area, and their protection is supported by rules on state asset administration, port governance, land control, and civil liability. Within that framework, the Security Directorate performs a central preventive and supervisory role by maintaining factual control over strategic facilities, monitoring vulnerabilities, documenting incidents, and coordinating with external authorities. Its contribution is therefore indispensable, even though it does not possess the full coercive powers of formal law enforcement institutions.

At the same time, this study shows that legal protection cannot be reduced to formal ownership or internal security routines. Effective protection depends on the interaction between lawful authority, orderly asset administration, operational capacity, and inter-agency coordination. Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code provides an important legal basis for claiming compensation when unlawful acts cause loss to port assets, but the value of that remedy depends on the institution's ability to prove control, loss, and causation. The same doctrine also reminds BP Batam that the exercise of asset authority must remain lawful and accountable.

The main weakness of the current framework is not the absence of law, but fragmented governance. Overlapping authority, incomplete coordination, uneven institutional capacity, and risks in internal governance can all reduce the practical effectiveness of protection. For that reason, the future of port asset protection in Batam requires a more integrated approach: clearer internal rules, stronger asset administration, more stable coordination with external agencies, improved professional capacity in Ditpam, and a more accountable governance culture. Only through that combined approach can BP Batam's port assets be protected not merely in a formal sense, but in a way that secures their legal integrity, operational continuity, and strategic public value.

Several practical recommendations follow from this analysis. BP Batam should strengthen internal regulations that specifically govern asset security procedures, incident reporting, evidence preservation, and inter-unit coordination in strategic port areas. Asset administration should be integrated more closely with security governance through updated certification, digital inventory systems, and periodic legal audit of land and infrastructure status. Cooperation with the police, land authorities, prosecutors, port regulators, and local government should be institutionalized through operational protocols rather than limited to general declarations of cooperation. Ditpam should receive continuous capacity development in legal documentation, conflict management, and procedural compliance. Governance reform within BP Batam should emphasize transparency, accountability, and internal control in all forms of asset utilization and development cooperation. Further research may compare Batam's asset protection model with those of other special economic or port zones in Indonesia in order to identify more transferable regulatory and institutional lessons.

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