Power Interplay Between Executive and Legislative in the formation of Undang-Undang Nomor. 3 Tahun 2022 Concerning Ibu Kota Negara

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Abstract: The main objective of this research is to discuss the power interplay between the executive and legislature in the formation of Law no. 3 of 2022 concerning Ibu Kota Negara. With a focus on the interaction of power between the two institutions in the process of forming the IKN Law. This research uses qualitative methods and is explained using the power cube theory by John Gaventa. In the formation of this law, most of the factions in the DPR RI out of a total of 9, only one opposition party refused to accept and approve the discussion of the IKN Bill. With the position of the government which has a large coalition (grand coalition) with membership in parliament reaching 74%. It can be seen that the role of the executive is more dominant than the role of the legislature in determining the direction of decisions on this Law, namely by conditioning the decisions taken by party factions that are members of supporting government supporters to fully support them.

Keyword: Power Interplay, Executive, Legislative

INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the power interplay between the executive and legislature in the formation of Undang-Undang no. 3 of 2022 concerning Ibu Kota Negara, or what is generally known by its abbreviation, the IKN Law. The absence of a Law that specifically regulates the Ibu Kota Negara in Indonesia is the background for drafting this Law. Therefore, the existence of the IKN Law as a legal basis is oriented towards regulating better governance of the National Capital, in terms of government and the size of spatial planning and living areas. So it is hoped that it can protect the Indonesian people who are located in the Mother City area from various threats ranging from ecological disasters, crime, corruption as well as increasing economic development which can ultimately advance general welfare.

Although the idea of moving IKN had been put forward since the era of President Soekarno, it coincided with July 17 1957 to move the new capital to Eastern Indonesia. In his initial plan, Soekarno projected Palangkaraya (Central Kalimantan Province) as a candidate for the new capital of Indonesia. But unfortunately, this idea could not be realized due to the changing political turmoil during the Parliamentary Democracy or Guided Democracy era.
After that, the second President, Soeharto, also recommended Jonggol as the new capital. Moreover, Soeharto had issued Presidential Decree (Kepres) No. 1 of 1997 concerning Coordination of the Development of the Jonggol Area as an Independent City, which was considered by many parties to be the initial legal basis for the plan to move the country's capital. Although the idea of moving IKN had been put forward since the time of President Soekarno, namely on July 17 1957 to move the new capital (Leo Agustino & Mutia Kartika Andalus 2022).

However, the idea of this capital relocation only became a passing trend during several periods of the president's leadership. Until President Jokowi's leadership began to revive the idea of moving IKN to East Kalimantan Province, namely North Penajam Paser and parts of Kutai Kartanegara (Aqil Syahru Akram 2022). In his state speech, President Jokowi, precisely on 26 August 2019, announced that the administrative areas of North Penajem Paser Regency and Kutai Kartanegara Regency would be formed as mega projects, because the new capital city would be moved from DKI Jakarta to these areas (Kominfo, 2019). Thus, moving the new capital city has actually become an issue for every regime in power (Herdiana 2020).

By assigning several line ministries to represent the Government in discussing the IKN Draft Law (RUU), it was included in the Priority National Legislation Program (prolegnas) in 2020. However, the proposal to discuss the IKN Bill from Jakarta to Kalimantan was only assigned by the government on September 29 2021 (President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021). After 2 months of receiving the draft IKN Bill, the DPR on December 7 2021 formed a special committee (pansus) from various party factions in the DPR RI consisting of 56 members, including 6 leaders. In DPR RI regulation No.2/2022 in article 109, ideally the time required to submit a bill that has been jointly approved by the DPR and the President takes 30 days or more for the president to ratify the bill after it has been jointly approved. However, the process of forming this Law was relatively controversial, namely in terms of a time period of 42 days with an effective time of only two weeks, because at that time it was cut short by the DPR's recess period, starting from December 7 2021. Then on January 18 2022 the DPR officially and the Government ratified the IKN Bill through the DPR RI paripurna session to become Law Number 3 of 2022.

In legislative discussions, they were not involved in the initial determination of the location of the nation's capital, even though the people's representation was in the DPR. However, in this determination the President only gave directions to Bappenas to study it without involving the DPR or DPD. So, if you look closely, this shows that the executive is the most dominant in implementing this plan. Of course, making a decision cannot be made unilaterally by the executive alone. Two reasons that support the government's plan to move the capital outside Jakarta are inequality and Jakarta's weak carrying capacity (Diningrat 2019). It is interesting to analyze the interaction of power between the executive and legislature regarding the formation of the IKN Law. Because moving the National Capital can be said to be an ambitious project in the era of Jokowi Ma'ruf Amin's administration.

Then political dominance was further emphasized by the position of the government which had a grand coalition or oversized coalition with membership in parliament reaching 74% (Prayudi, 2022). The support of the absolute majority of political parties in parliament has increasingly given Jokowi Ma'ruf Amin's government the confidence to realize its ambition to move the nation's capital. This political dominance shows the coalition's full support for the political program of its government. The mainstream parties in power in parliament that support Jokowi Ma'ruf Amin's government in the second period of his leadership in the 2019-2024 legislative elections, namely PDIP, Nasdem, Gerindra, Golkar, PKB, PAN and PPP.

The dominance of Jokowi Ma'ruf Amin's government coalition in parliament was the main factor in smoothing the political compromise of the legislature to override public criticism and rejection in the formation of this law. Where several laws that have high urgency actually
require quite a long time in the process of being drafted and have not been discussed until now (Aqil Syahru Akram 2022). One of the government programs that was successfully achieved due to majority support in parliament was the ratification of the IKN Bill into the IKN Law. The decision taken by the legislature seems to be in one voice with the government to support the IKN transfer policy. Of course, this is due to negotiations and incentives given by the executive to the parties joining the grand coalition or the push for a cabinet reshuffle which dominates the coalition of political parties in parliament. This is due to the success of parties in including their interests in election system policies, which continues to illustrate that election regulations in Indonesia are determined by party elites. (Prayudi 2022).

In the formation of this law, most of the party factions in the DPR RI out of a total of 9, only one opposition party refused to accept and approve the discussion of the IKN Bill. Most of the parties supporting the government such as PDIP, Nasdem, Gerindra, Golkar, PKB, PAN and PPP accepted and approved the IKN Bill. However, the Democratic Party faction, which previously did not agree with the government's proposal regarding the IKN Bill, finally accepted and approved the IKN Bill to become the IKN Law. Only one government opposition party, namely the PKS faction, has been consistent from the start in not agreeing with the IKN Bill being declared the IKN Law (DPR RI 2022).

This study has discovered from several previous research entitled Power Interplay In The Implementation Of Legislative Functions (case study: conflict on Padang Panjang parliament within the determination of KUA PPAS fiscal year 2017) discusses power interplay carried out by regional level legislative actors (DPRD) tries to carry out domination efforts which are utilized for group or personal interests which cause conflict in the formation of General Budget Policy and Temporary Budget Ceiling Priorities (KUA PPAS). The number of factions is much more dominant than other factions, meaning that many main positions in the DPRD are easily controlled by parties that have a large faction, namely the Golkar Party Faction (As'ad Albatroy Jalius, K 2018). Likewise, research entitled Executive-Legislative Relations in Democratic Regimes discusses the power dynamics between the executive and legislature in policy making in parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential systems. This research explores how the executive establishes a working relationship with the legislature to maintain control over the negotiations that occur in policy formation to achieve the policy results they want. In this case, it is the executive who manages the coalition in parliament, by changing constitutional regulations so that they can influence which bills can become law (Taylor-Robinson, M 2020).

The significance of this research is because there has been no research that focuses on looking at the interaction of power between the executive and legislative in the formation of laws, especially in the formation of the IKN Law. This research is particularly novel in political science because previous research conducted more research related to power interactions between legislative actors and the strength of one of the political party factions in parliament. Thus, the focus of this research is to analyze how the executive agency (government) can dominate parliament by forming a grand coalition. Even though this only happens in countries that adopt a parliamentary system. Meanwhile, Indonesia as a country that adheres to a presidential system, why is there a government grand coalition in parliament in a presidential system? because the relations and roles of the two executive and legislative institutions should be balance each other in the formation of laws. This power interaction will emerge after the results of qualitative data processing by researchers. Researchers have a hypothesis or research assumption that in the process of forming the IKN Law, the role of the executive is more dominant than the legislature in determining the direction of decisions on this Law, namely by conditioning decisions taken by party factions that are members of the coalition supporting the government to fully support it.
METHOD
This research uses descriptive qualitative methods by focusing on the interaction of power between the executive and legislative in the formation of Law No.3 of 2022 concerning Ibu Kota Negara. So the research object used in this research is the Law on National Capital. In research to obtain factual, credible and actual data, the author carried out direct data collection techniques by means of interviews conducted with Members of the DPR RI, Members of the Ministry PPP-BAPPENAS and minutes of the meeting on the formation of the IKN Law in the parliament as primary data.

Meanwhile, secondary data is obtained from library literature which originates from graphic documents such as tables, meeting notes, analytical data, photographs, etc. which are related to the topic and research object in the form of writing, data, or other forms (Yusuf 2014). Then, after collecting data related to the research topic, data analysis and data interpretation need to be carried out in accordance with the data analysis technique by Miles & Huberman which is divided into three stages, namely: data reduction, data presentation and conclusion drawing (Zuchri Abdussamad 2021).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Dynamics of Executive and Legislative Relations in the formation of the IKN Law
Regarding the discourse regarding the transfer of the National Capital to the name Nusantara, it has now achieved success by becoming an official decision in the era of the Jokowi administration. To be precise, this decision is contained in Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning National Capital (IKN) (Agustino & Andalus, 2022). However, in the successful inauguration of the Jokowi government's decision on the IKN Law, of course there were dynamics that occurred between the government and the DPR RI. Because this policy product is the work of the government and the DPR RI. So it is important to know the relationship between President Jokowi (the government) and the DPR RI, which is divided into several political party factions in general, and then specifically regarding the policy of moving the capital city.

The dynamics that occur between the two institutions have a complex and dynamic process, which cannot be separated from the influence of a number of political factors that cannot be separated from the interaction of power mixed with various kinds of interests. In the successful inauguration of the IKN law, the author found two interesting things that are worth noting. Firstly, if you look at the idea of moving the capital city based on history, the idea of moving the capital city has been in public discussion since the early era of independence until the Jokowi administration, but only in the Jokowi government era was it successful in making the move of the capital city a decision. politics which is a big step for Indonesia. Second, the speed of the process of formulating the capital city relocation policy in the Jokowi era has become a familiar issue in the public, namely the formation of the IKN Law only took 43 days.

Table 1. Chronology of the Preparation of the National Capital Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>29 September 2021</td>
<td>President Joko Widodo sent a proposed Presidential Letter regarding the relocation of the capital city to the People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>27 Desember 2021</td>
<td>The DPR RI formed a special committee (Pansus) to draft a law regarding the new national capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3 Januari 2022</td>
<td>Several members of the DPR RI conducted a comparative study to Kazakhstan to gain views on the complexities of moving the capital city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>18 Januari 2022</td>
<td>The initial version of the IKN Law was issued and continues to be “improved” by the DPR RI Special Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>15 Februari 2022</td>
<td>The IKN Law finally passed in paripurna meetings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (DPR RI 2022)
However, with the success of the Jokowi government, it made the decision to move the capital and created the legal basis for the move through the IKN Law. There are still many public questions regarding the seriousness of Jokowi's government which only became apparent at the end of his reign, which is closely related to waiting for the political stability of his government. If we look back at the reasons for moving the capital city by going back a little further, President Jokowi has repeatedly during his reign shown his seriousness about moving the capital city from Jakarta in various meetings, both with high-ranking state officials and political party events (Hutasoit, 2019; Kurniadi, 2019). For example, as reported by Tempo.co (06 May 2019), Jokowi expressed a serious commitment from the government regarding the IKN transfer policy in a joint breaking fast event on 6 May 2019 in the presence of high-ranking state institution officials. The event was attended by Anwar Usman (Chairman of the Constitutional Court), Zulkifli Hasan (Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly), there were also two deputy chairmen of the MPR namely Muhamin Iskandar and Ahmad Basarah, Bambang Soesatyo (Chairman of the DPR), Oesman Sapta Odang (Chairman of the Regional Representative Council) , and a number of Jokowi's ministers were also present. In the event which was attended by top officials from state institutions, Jokowi stated: 

"While meeting with the chairman and heads of state institutions, I would like to touch a little on matters relating to the capital. We are serious about this... Once again we will decide on moving the capital but we will still consult with you ladies and gentlemen." (Tempo.co. 06. May 2019)

From Jokowi's statement it can be clearly seen that the position of relocating the capital city that has been announced by President Jokowi will actually be hammered as a decision. Thus, his remarks in front of state officials could be read as mere pleasantries, or simply asking for suggestions for improvements, not considerations as to whether moving the capital city was feasible or not. Then, if we look back again by looking at the Bappenas timeline, it is stated that the timeline for implementing the plan to move the capital city started in 2017. So the plan to move the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, or abbreviated by the acronym IKN RI, to East Kalimantan (Kaltim) is not an issue that appeared suddenly, but had been planned over a relatively long period of time. This is as stated by the Chair of the Expert Team for the Formation of the IKN Law from BAPPENAS, Jiwangga Yusuf Upadana, S.H: (Jiwangga, 2024)

"Because of the urgency, the IKN development has actually been planned from 2020, so it has been included in the RPJMN. But at Bappenas itself, the planning analysis for moving the capital city has been going on for quite some time since 2017. So the president asked the DPR for permission to move the capital city to Kalimanta in August 2019, in fact the target stage in the law is before 2024 It has moved the capital from Jakarta to the archipelago. Only because of Covid-19 it has been delayed, including the legal basis for implementing the transfer of the capital city itself. "So, yes, if you look at it, the government is speeding it up, because yes, the process must be accelerated, because this is the main aim of IKN, one of which is to act as a catalyst for Golden Indonesia 2045."

However, from the start, the PDI-P elite, as the main party supporting Jokowi, was solid in supporting IKN's policy ideas. This is as stated by Member of the IKN Special Committee from the PDI-P Fraction, Andreas Eddy Susetyo: (Andreas, 2024) revealed that the transfer of our mother had received full support from Megawati as General Chair of the PDIP. Andreas also said that Megawati was actively discussing moving the capital both internally in the party and with the general chairs of Jokowi's supporting political parties. "The chairman of the DPR is from PDIP (Puan Maharani) and we have the most (seats in the DPR). PDIP is very active, and from the start we had the concept of Bung Karno's era." Under the pretext of continuing Soekarno's (Bung Karna) ideals which had been delayed in realizing the move of the capital,
the PDI-P elite supported, encouraged and supervised Jokowi’s idea to move the capital into political policy.

Then, before the Jokowi government assigned the DPR to form the IKN Law, there was also another event that was no less important, namely before Prabowo Subianto joined the Jokowi government coalition. As a former political rival in the 2019 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto held a meeting with Jokowi. As reported by Kompas (11 October 2019), Prabowo met with Jokowi at the Presidential Palace on 11 October 2019, which was about 2 weeks before Prabowo decided to join Jokowi’s government coalition. After the meeting, Prabowo stated that he fully supports President Jokowi’s plan to move the country’s capital. There were at least 4 General Chairmen of Political Parties who received ministerial seats during the Advanced Indonesia Cabinet period, namely:

1. Prabowo Subianto (General Chairman of Gerindra) serves as Minister of Defense.
2. Airlangga Hartanto (Golkar General Chair) serves as Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs).
3. Zulkiifli Hasan (General Chair of PAN) serves as Minister of Trade.
4. Suharso Monoarfa (General Chair of PPP) serves as Minister of National Development Planning/Head of Bappenas.

If we look closely at the incident above, namely three strategic ministry posts occupied by party chairmen, it can be seen that this incident is directly related to the policy issue of moving the capital city. Especially Suharso Monoarfa who serves as Head of Bappenas, Coordinating Minister for the Economy who is held by Airlangga who supervises Minister of Trade Zulkiifli Hasan. Don't forget the issue of IKN policy regarding defense and security which is under the Ministry of Defense which is also led by the general chairman of the party, namely Prabowo Subianto. (Republik.co.id, 20 January 2022). For example, Zulkiifli Hasan, who at that time was still Deputy Chair of the MPR (before becoming Minister of Trade) had leaked plans that the IKN Law would be promulgated in early 2022. He conveyed this information towards the end of 2021 during a working visit to East Kalimantan. The following is Zulkiifli Hasan's statement.

"God willing, the IKN Bill will be completed in January 2022. I really support it," said Zulkiifli. (Nation Corner, 28 December 2021).

Then, if the article above discusses the success factors in the birth of the IKN Law which is supported by the strategic positions of ministers held by the general chairman of the party. There are also other factors that need to be considered as to why all members of the government party coalition agreed to the IKN transfer policy. If you look at the composition of the Jokowi government coalition, it reaches 74% in the DPR RI with seven parties, which is enough to be able to make every government policy product a success, so it can be said that the IKN policy is relatively easier to pass into law. This is because the policy of moving the country's capital does not involve two controversial issues in society such as the increase in fuel prices or is related to the political parties themselves (threshold policy). By not touching on these two controversial areas, the IKN Law policy is very easy to agree on. Then, with adequate support from supporting parties in parliament, no party will feel disadvantaged. So that the IKN Law as a product of government initiative policy is able to convince almost all parties involved of the benefits that will be obtained from this policy. Thus, the process of formulating the IKN Law can be said to be quite smooth, even the dynamics that occur are less sharp and are only procedural in nature. The problems that occurred during the process of formulating the IKN Law were no more than mere procedural administrative and technical problems.

Then, the political stability of the Jokowi government through the composition of the coalition also has an impact on the effectiveness of a policy. Where parliament is divided into political party factions, it opens up the reality of fractionalization in parliament. There are various institutionalism factors that can be used to explain why a political policy in the context
of the presidential system adopted by Indonesia can be easily achieved (Djayadi Hanan, 2012). According to Djayadi Hanan, the political reality factor of fractionalization can emphasize that the decisions of legislators are very dependent on the policy lines of political parties. Simply put, fractionalization is a character where each member of parliament is more dependent on direction from the party leadership or is factional (party). In other words, this shows that members of parliament make political decisions not based on their individual preferences, but rather on the attitudes of political parties.

In this context, ensuring political consolidation is one of the concrete functions of political parties in Indonesia. If in proposing a policy the president has to communicate and consolidate with each of the 560 legislative members in parliament, it will be difficult. Because to get support for a policy, the president must get at least half the support from all members of parliament or from the commission according to the substance of the policy being aimed at. In this way, this is where the important role of political parties can act to simplify consolidation between the President and their legislative members in parliament.

So from a brief description of moving the nation's capital in the era of President Jokowi’s administration, we can assume that if consolidation in the form of a large coalition cannot be formed in President Jokowi's second term of leadership, then it could be the Jokowi government's ambition to move the nation's capital through the IKN policy and various policies. Other strategies will certainly not be realized quickly. In this way, it can be identified related to the political process at work in the IKN Law Decree, which starts from the president's wishes and can then quickly be realized into policy. Policy constraints can be seen at the beginning of President Jokowi's first term (Nugroho, 2020). After the 2014 election, support from political elites and the general public was still influenced by political tensions that occurred due to tensions between the two political camps divided between Jokowi and Prabowo. So the emergence of the Jokowi camp and the Prabowo camp gave birth to various prolonged political polemics. The political situation that has not subsided due to political contestation between the two camps is of course a disaster for the Jokowi government because it can hinder the government's movement to realize its various strategic programs.

The big government coalition in parliament that supports the success of the policy of moving the National Capital has proven to be very effective. This was acknowledged directly by one of the members of the IKN Special Committee from PKS, Mardani Ali Sera, (Mardani, 2024):

"When we talk about the constitution, the function of the DPR is checks and balances, but the fact is that this coalition is quite large so that in the current period it is no more dynamic than in previous periods. Especially recently when Gerindra entered the government." In this way, it can be understood that the unity of Jokowi's supporting parties with a majority of seats in parliament as a result of the consolidation of their large coalition has resulted in the opposition being powerless in discussing every policy proposal, especially the IKN Law policy. Without this, the success of the planning for the IKN Law is indeed questionable. Perhaps the relocation of the capital could indeed happen, but the process was not as quick as what happened. It takes a longer time in terms of planning, especially when it comes to moving the country's capital. Evidence of the effectiveness of Jokowi's presidential leadership with the support of a large coalition is reflected in the support of the majority of parliament for IKN policies. Pay attention to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fraction views</th>
<th>Fraction name</th>
<th>number of seats occupied in the DPR RI</th>
<th>Coalitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accepting</td>
<td>PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, Gerindra, PPP, PAN, PKB</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting with notes</td>
<td>Demokrat</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Non-coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table tells us that there are only two remaining parties (Democrats and PKS) which in fact are not members of a coalition that has an attitude at odds with the majority. The table also shows the compatibility between multiparty presidential coalitions that secure or make a policy very effective. It is very difficult not to strongly suspect that the partnership factor that has been established in the presidential coalition is the most underlying reason why the IKN transfer policy was so easily approved by parliament. Mardani Ali Sera (Member of the Special Committee for the IKN Bill/PKS Fraction) told researchers: "This is not only happening in the IKN Law. The nuance is that there are government parties and there are opposition parties. As soon as there is a government-initiated law, there is a message for all members of the DPR, we must secure it, that's how it is. Not only in this law, the Ciptaker Law, the HKPD Law. Once the government proposes, the task of the parties supporting the government is to secure it. That's what I caught the nuance of. There are personal (opinions) (of DPR members) in the discussion, there are dynamics. However, it does not affect the final result. The proof is that the date set is according to plan, even though it is not in accordance with the discussion, the important thing is to catch it first, later we will revise it again later." (Mardani, 2024).

The statement that there was a connection between coalitional support for IKN policies was also stated by Ahmad Doli Kurnia Tanjung, Chair of the Special Committee from Golkar. He said "Golkar, because this is part of Pak Jokowi's strategic program or policy and is very important, and Golkar at that time was still related to the party supporting Pak Jokowi, was in the government, of course its policies will also be resolved regarding this law." (Ahmad Doli, 2024). Researchers also asked Ahmad Doli Kurnia Tanjung, whether there were any objections or criticisms of IKN policies among members of parliament? He said that only PKS was vocal in voicing many corrections, but that was not the case for the coalition parties. He said, "From the coalition party or not, maybe it's just a matter of time. Time, for example the economic situation, general input. "But for example, (disputing) the law and the transfer doesn't exist." (Ahmad Doli, 2024).

The full support of the president's coalition party in parliament was also demonstrated by the fairly short political process in Senayan. The draft that had been prepared by the executive was then submitted to the DPR for further discussion by sending a presidential letter regarding During the discussion process in parliament, the discourse on moving the capital city to the People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) dated September 29 2021. Then irregularities emerged including the shortness of the discussion in The Special Committee for the IKN Bill until 18 August 2021, the initial version of the IKN Law was issued and continues to be "improved" by the DPR RI Special Committee. On February 15 2022 the IKN Law was passed.

**Power Interplay between Executive and Legislative using Powercube Theory**

The political process that occurred in ratifying this policy is no less important to pay attention to. This political process involves interaction between the government (President), relevant ministers, and political forces (DPR and political parties) in the formulation and ratification of the capital city relocation policy. Powercubes theory can be used to explain and analyze the basics of power in the context of legislative or executive power. Apart from that, it includes looking at the phenomena in the relationships and interactions that occurred between legislative and executive actors in the formation of the Law on National Capital. This is because the relationship between political actors is one of the dimensions of the power cube. Through this method, the power cube theory makes it possible to photograph the places where power...
relations occur or where interactions occur with each other in the process of forming the National Capital Law (John Gaventa, 2006).

According to Powercube theory, power is defined as the ability of an individual or organization to exercise control over other individuals or groups. In addition, Powercube provides a framework for analyzing three aspects of power, namely level, space, and shape. When we talk about Powercube dimensional levels, we mean multiple levels of decision-making and authority held on a vertical scale. These levels include local, national and global. By looking at the following image, we can observe the various dimensions included in the power cube theory. These dimensions can explain the factors that contribute to power:

![Powercube Theory](https://dinastires.org/JLPH)

Source: (Bob Hendriks, 2010)

Although a cube is depicted in cube form, each side of the cube must be considered as dimensionless or interconnected, not as a fixed or unchanging set. By using the power cube theory, the process of identifying and mapping the factors that contribute to power can be simplified, including the actors, challenges and circumstances behind it. In general, the forms of these three dimensions can be categorized as follows:

1. **Level Dimension**, on a vertical scale consisting of local, national and global levels, refers to several layers of decision making and the authority possessed by each layer.
2. **Space Dimension**, in particular: refers to the arena of possible involvement and activity, which in this case includes what is called closed space, permitted space and claimed/created space.
3. **Forms dimension**, namely: refers to the way power displays itself in the form of visible power. In the context of interactions that occur between the executive and legislative branches hidden forms, and invisible forms.

   of power, these interactions can be seen through the three dimensions of the power cube. First, if you look at the power interactions that occurred during the formation of the IKN Law through the level dimension, the areas of power interaction in this dimension range from the national to the local scale. At the local level, the power interactions that occur can be reflected through local government and local communities.

   Then at the national level, power interactions are manifested through central government institutions, political parties and political actors within them. The process of forming the law regarding the National Capital was influenced by political dynamics on a national scale. So it can be understood that the government and political parties are the key players in determining the final decision, with all their political influence to fight for their interests in the legislative process. So that the ratification of a national law will of course also have an impact on the lives of local people, both those involved and those who have never been involved in the process of
forming this law. The statement that there was a community involvement during the process of forming the IKN policies was also stated by Jiwangga Yusuf Upadana from BAPPENAS. He said:

“Regarding to community involvement, yes, because when we carried out several public consultations, we did involve various community representatives from National to local level themselves, we also did this in many places such as Medan, Balikpapan, Samarinda, Makassar, Jakarta and Bali. But we also can’t hope that the entire public will be well informed, because we only invite people who have a direct impact and actually have the input we need. So the essence of public consultation is in accordance with statutory regulations, because you really want to get input from the public. But for public communication from the government to the community to provide a broader understanding, such as holding a press conference or something whose purpose is to introduce it, that is indeed lacking. We only did that, massive public communication after the law was passed. Because there is an obligation to carry out public outreach after the law is finalized”.

But for the example of local communities as the parties most affected by the relocation of the capital city certainly have an interest and therefore need to be involved in the planning process and decision making. However, unfortunately, in the context of the IKN Law, community participation in planning IKN development can be said to be just a formality. In fact, community involvement in this law has not been accompanied by the delegation of community power and authority to be involved in decision making.

Meanwhile, if you look at the interaction of power through the space dimension, it is related to power relationships in decision making. The space dimension in the context of the IKN Law refers to opportunities and channels for the community through which they can take actions that have the potential to influence decision making. However, if you look at the interaction space for the formation of the IKN Law, there were still many meetings held during the process of forming the IKN Law which were held behind closed doors. With this, we can realize that in the formation of the IKN Law there was still a lot of closed decision-making space. This means that political decisions in the capital city relocation policy are based on decisions from executive and legislative political actors only, where in fact decisions from legislative members also depend more on directions from party leaders or are factional (party). Even though in the process there is still involvement of affected communities through invited spaces, community involvement is still limited to providing input and suggestions during public consultations and does not influence the final decisions of decision-making actors (Elvira, K 2023).

Lastly, the power interactions can be seen in the formation of the National Capital Law in the form dimension. Power interactions in visible form include open formation processes such as national dialogue forums, public hearings (RDPU) and paripurna meetings in parliament. The government and legislature as actors play an important role in the formation of this law. The decision-making process, including debate and voting, occurs at open meetings that are accessible to the public. Meanwhile, hidden forms of power interactions in the process of forming the IKN Law include executive and legislative powers to influence each other's decisions, which are not always visible directly. The hidden form in this case is lobbying and negotiation efforts between the government and members of the DPR RI as stakeholders whose form is not directly visible but can influence decisions in the policy process.

Furthermore, in invisible forms of power, the power interactions that occur are not detected or openly acknowledged, but still have a significant impact on the policy process. In the formation of the National Capital Law, this invisible form of power, which became a significant problem regarding the relocation of the national capital, was not only hidden from the decision-making table, but also from the awareness of the various parties involved. Even communities that may be directly affected by the relocation of the capital. This invisible form
of power interaction is carried out by influencing all parties involved that they will benefit from the policy, as Jokowi did by convincing all parties and elites that the capital relocation project benefits all parties, resulting in the formation of the IKN Law, minimal resistance from political actors and society.

CONCLUSION

There are various factors that caused the idea of Moving the National Capital (IKN) to become official policy (Law Number 3 of 2022) in the era of President Jokowi. In fact, it only took a relatively short period of time for this policy to be passed in the DPR. In general, the presence of large coalition of government in parliament at 74% was the main factor that caused the process of ratifying the IKN Law to take place in a short time. In this research, the interaction of power between the executive and legislative is seen in the relationship between the President and political parties in the DPR. Then, in smoothing the IKN policy into law, President Jokowi has shown his consistency from the start. Starting from giving directions to Bappenas to conduct studies, building communication with leaders of high-level institutions, to organizing a large coalition by building political consolidation between Jokowi and Prabowo as his political rivals in the 2019 election, this will have a big impact on political stability and the effectiveness of President Jokowi's policies.

For Jokowi's government, this is certainly a positive thing, because the first period of his government was marked by Jokowi's efforts to carry out political consolidation with party political elites to form a large coalition. So that in the second period this becomes an acceleration momentum so that the relocation of the country's capital can be realized with the enactment of the IKN Law as the legal basis. The short time pressure, for a program that could take a very long time, but received full political support, allowed President Jokowi to speed up the process of ratifying the IKN policy into a binding political policy.

Meanwhile, John Gaventa's powercube theory can describe the regional level relationship, space and form of power between the President and the DPR in the IKN Law policy, where these dimensions can also interact to influence other dimensions. Likewise, the interaction of power between the executive and legislative branches influences each other's decision making based on group or individual interests. As a final conclusion, it appears that starting from planning to move the country's capital to the process of forming the IKN Law, the executive has greater dominance than the legislature. In the context of relocating the capital city, apart from economic and ecological factors, President Jokowi's wishes are the main driving force for determining the relocation of the capital city through the IKN Law. In this case, President Jokowi is the determinant of the success of the promulgation of Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning Ibu Kota Negara.

REFERENCES


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