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Tunisian Fragile Democratization: Case of Democratic Backsliding during Kais Saied's Presidency

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Abstract: Tunisia is the only Arab country that has successfully carried out a revolution and democratization after the Arab Spring. However, this success cannot guarantee that democracy can survive and run well, especially in meeting the demands or expectations of the community. This paper aims to explain the decline of democracy during the Kais Saied administration after ten years of democracy implemented in Tunisia. This research uses Quantitative methods to explain the obstacles to the development of democracy. Multiple regression analysis techniques were used in this research to analyze the primary data: the Democracy Index by the Economic Intelligence Unit, Tunisia's GDP Growth (Annual) by the World Bank, and the Freedom of the World score by Freedom House to determine the influence of economic growth and the level of freedom on the decline of democracy in Tunisia. The study results show that economic growth and the level of freedom are interrelated with the prevailing government system. Aspects of political culture among the community and political elites influence the implementation of democracy. Democracy has not been able to be the key to overcoming challenges related to economic growth and high levels of corruption in Tunisia. The failure of political parties to carry out their duties and establish good relations with the community has hampered the development of democracy and encouraged the decline of the democratic regime in Tunisia through President Kais Saied's decision to dissolve parliament.

Keyword: Backsliding Democracy, Political Culture, Democracy Index, GDP Growth.

INTRODUCTION

Tunisia's success in going through the wave of democracy, namely the "Arab Spring," has been recorded as a new history in the Middle East. The reason is that among several Middle Eastern countries also hit by the Arab Spring wave, Tunisia is the only country that has succeeded in transforming its government system from authoritarian to democratic and maintaining it for more than a decade. The wave of democracy, or the Arab Spring, began with an incident in Tunisia known as the Mohammed Bouzaizi incident. This fruit seller dared to burn himself right in front of the court of the Sidi Bouzid Regional Council office. The incident sparked protest movements and riots in almost all Arab countries in early 2011 (Ibad, Faizul; Muta'ali,

2021). The protest incident created solidarity, attracting the participation of people from various ideologies and circles. The struggle succeeded in overthrowing several state leaders in the Middle East but also killed thousands of demonstrators. The social movements that emerged during the Arab Spring succeeded in causing political upheaval in several countries in the Middle East in 2011 (Yasmine, 2015)

The struggle to change the dictatorial government system to democracy in Tunisia is called the Jasmine Revolution. The Jasmine Revolution started in late 2010. The Jasmine Revolution was the reason behind the fall of Tunisia's dictator leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, on 14 January 2011. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, commonly known as Ben Ali, was the second president of Tunisia. Ben Ali has led Tunisia for 23 years since he took over power in Tunisia from President Habib Bourguiba on 7 November 1987 (ACCORD, 2015). After that, Ben Ali launched reforms that seemed to represent liberalization in Tunisia's political culture, but the real goal was to consolidate his power. During his reign, Ben Ali created an atmosphere of fear. He prevented proper communication between political actors at every level in Tunisia to maintain his power after the success of the Jasmine Revolution in overthrowing the Ben Ali regime. Tunisia continued its steps, namely transitioning from the Tunisian political system to a democratic political system.

The efforts of revolution and transition of the political system in Tunisia are relatively successful. The revolution in Tunisia maintained the democratic system, did not return to authoritarianism like Egypt, and did not experience chaos during the transition process like Syria, Yemen, and Libya. However, at the end of 2019, Tunisia began to show signs of backsliding in its democratic system, shown through several decisions and actions made by President Kais Saied, that considered to lead to authoritarianism. One of President Kais Saied's decisions that was a sign of the beginning of the decline of democracy in Tunisia was the decision regarding the suspension of parliament in July 2021. That decision caused tension in Kais Saied's relationship with political parties in Tunisia, including Ennahda. President Kais Saied's reason for suspending and dissolving parliament was to end the corruption by Tunisian political parties. Which not only suspends parliament but also disbands the Supreme Judicial Council, the body that ensures the independence of the judiciary. In addition, President Kais Saied also made arrests using violence against his critics. That gave rise to several opinions calling Kais Saied's actions a "presidential coup," but the majority of Tunisian public opinion showed support for Kais Saied's intervention, and they saw it as a way to end the corruption that was occurring in Tunisia (Gbadamosi, 2022).

At the beginning of President Kais Saied's administration, Tunisia's economy was in a fairly bad condition, indicated by the high unemployment rate and the delayed state salary in January 2022. The International Alert Tunisia study mentioned that around 51 percent of Tunisians aged 18 to 29 planned to immigrate to the Mediterranean for economic reasons. On the other hand, Tunisia's debt soared to almost 100 percent of the country's GDP. Since Tunisia transitioned to democracy, the economic condition has not been good. There are mixed or unstable economic growth prospects. Data on the economic growth of the North African region shows that Tunisia's economic growth has decreased from 3.6 percent in 2012 to 2.9 percent in 2013. There has been a slowdown in economic growth in almost all economic sectors in Tunisia ("Tunisia: Economic Situation and Outlook in the Current Transition Phase," 2014).

In the period after the transition to democracy in Tunisia, Tunisia faced with challenges not only in the economic sector but also in the political sector. These challenges hamper the development of Tunisia's democratic system. The challenges in the Tunisian political sector divided into 3, that was political instability including (the interaction between political parties has many shortcomings, the relationship between political parties and society were not well established), the government failure to overcome the corruption rate, and there are several

failures of the parties leading the government in overcoming economic and political challenges in Tunisia.

The interaction between political parties in Tunisia in the post-revolutionary period had many shortcomings, such as a problematic political alliance in the order of relations between parties, namely between the Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes parties. The alliance between the two parties can work well in terms of sharing the benefits of the political power obtained. However, it cannot meet the people's expectations, especially the revolutionary youth in Tunisia. The old regime tried to maintain its position through cooperation with the Islamist party, Ennahda. However, this cooperation hindered the process of political competition and excluded society from the division of power. Which caused most parties in the Tunisian political system except Ennahda to create an open structure (Yardımcı-geyikçi & Tür, 2018). This situation makes some political parties unable to legitimize the new system for the wider community. The shortcomings in the interaction of political parties in Tunisia are interrelated. Because the Ennahda and Nidaa parties have dominant power, other political parties have weak roots of power, so they cannot challenge the dominance of Ennahda and Nidaa in Tunisian politics.

The relationship between political parties and society that is not running well hinders Tunisia's development towards Democratic Consolidation. It caused by the increasing dissatisfaction of the population with the problem of legitimacy, where political parties fail to fulfill their responsibilities to fulfill the wishes and expectations of the people for their country. Instability and legitimacy problems in the political system have a negative impact on the consolidation process in Tunisia, causing the relationship between political parties and society to tend to be weak. When political parties do not have a strong position in the eyes of the public, the public will not accept political parties as central actors in the political consolidation system. The social contract between political parties and society will also fail, which is the basis for the development of democracy called "New Democracy" (Yardımcı-geyikçi & Tür, 2018).

Corruption in Tunisia is also one of the biggest challenges hindering the development of the democratic system in Tunisia. Because corruption not only threatens the economic sector but also has an impact on political practices, poses a security threat to both the state and its people, and threatens aspects of people's freedom (Tymoshenko et al., 2022). Although corruption cannot contribute directly to the decline of democracy, corruption can affect or have a negative impact on almost all aspects of the state. Which also affects the quality of the implementation of the Tunisian democratic system.

This research uses Theories of Political Culture or political culture theory to explain political outcomes through widely shared beliefs, norms, attitudes, practices, and rituals, which have deep emotional resonance and can separate between appropriate and inappropriate behavior that is socially approved. The theory of democratic political culture is a structural that divided into three essential ways in which most groups own culture. Culture is a legacy from the past, where individuals learn cultural norms through parents, teachers, and repeated interactions with other members of society, and although individuals can form a culture that is not static over time, changes in culture tend to be relatively slow and are not entirely under the control of political leaders (Waldner & Lust, 2018).

Structural characteristics in political culture could be seen through the consistency between the status quo of democracy and its values, as well as the cultural practices that underlie its norms. Based on the opinion of Inglehart and Welzel (2005), democracy requires a transition from traditional and survival-oriented values to secular and self-expressive values. This theory will explain how changes in political and cultural values or practices occur during the transition of the political system to democracy and vice versa. Political culture theory can be use to explain the political culture that occurs on both sides, namely from the side of society as an agent who submits requests, to explain how the orientation of society's culture and its behavior from time to time and the side of the political elite as an agent who provides offers, to explain how the

orientation of the political elite culture and its behavior from time to time (Waldner & Lust, 2018).

The Concept of Democracy Backsliding measures the level of decline in the quality of the democratic system implemented in a country. How government institutions implement democracy shows the quality of democracy itself, namely whether democracy in the country is included in the group of good democracy, perfect democracy, liberal democracy, participatory, or hibrid democracy (Munck, 2016). The Backsliding of democracy could seen through the decline in the status of a country's democratic regime. In democracy, there are three goals that must be achieved: Freedom of Choice, Freedom of Tyranny, and Equality in Freedom (Jee et al., 2019). These three main objectives must be exist in a democratic government system. If one is not exist, it can hinder the realization of other objectives that will affect the quality of the democratic system and cause a decline in democracy in a country. Indicators that could be use to identify the backsliding in democracy that shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Concept of Democracy Backsliding

The idea of civil society comes from a definite historical background, namely an authoritarian state. The concept of civil society indicates the existence of a social group that seeks to be involved in political practices and state power. The collapse of the dictatorial government system gave rise to the concept of civil society. It connected civil society with political agents or actors to pursue different agendas, such as expanding the market, carrying out political transitions, local campaigns, and so on. The concept of civil society emerged to examine how people's rights are enforced and how civil society is involved in political practices, both individually and in groups (Chandhoke, 2007). This paper aims to explain the decline in Tunisian democracy that occurred during the Kais Saied administration after ten years of Tunisia's implementation of democracy. This article attempts to explain aspects of political culture both in the community and the political elite, the economic and political challenges faced, Tunisian society's support for the continuation of democracy, and the reasons underlying Kais Saied's decision to dissolve parliament, which caused the decline of Tunisian democracy.

METHOD

This type of research is descriptive research, where the author tries to describe accurately and systematically a population, situation, or phenomenon. This descriptive research uses a quantitative method, a type of non-experimental research, in which the variables used are measured numerically (Hardani et al., 2022). This study examines how the decline of democracy during President Kais Saied's era could occur. One of them is by seeing whether

there is a significant relationship or influence between the decline in the democratic regime using the democracy index in the EIU data for 2018-2022 as a dependent variable with the level of economic growth or Tunisian GDP and the level of freedom in Tunisia based on the Freedom in the World score data from Freedom House for 2018-2022 as an independent variable.

The Democracy Index issued by the Economic Intelligence Unit will be derive from five indicator categories: the electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. Each category has a value on a scale from 0 to 10. The index value will derive from the simple average of the five categories (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2022).

Data related to the level of economic growth, namely GDP growth (annual%), issued by the World Bank, which will obtained through the calculation of data obtained from each indicator using the aggregation method. In calculating the GDP growth value (annual), the World Bank uses the indicators offered by the System of National Accounts, which will divide into 3: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Volume, Real Gross Domestic Income, and Real Gross National Income. Data related to the three indicators comes from the World Bank National Accounts Data and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) National Accounts Data Files (World et al. | DataBank, n.d.).

Table 1. Freedom of the World Indicators


	Political Rights				Civil Liberties		
	Electoral Process	Political Pluralism & Participation	Functioning of Government	Freedom of Expression & Belief	Associational & Organizational Rights	Rule of Law	Personal Autonomy & Individual rights
Methodology Questions	A1: Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?	B1: Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	C1: Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	D1: Are there free and independent media?	E1: Is there freedom of assembly?	F1: Is there an independent judiciary?	G1: Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?
	A2: Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?	B2: Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	C2: Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	D2: Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?	E2: Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights- and governance-related work?	F2: Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	G2: Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?
	A3: Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?	B3: Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ <u>extrapolitical</u> means?	C3: Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	D3: Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	E3: Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations?	F3: Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	G3: Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?
		B4: Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?		D4: Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?		F4: Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	G4: Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?

Source: Freedom in the World Research Methodology – Freedom House

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Democracy Tren in Tunisia

Chart 1. Tunisian Liberal Democracy Trend



Source: Data processed by researchers obtained through V-dem

Based on the Liberal Democracy Index or LDI data obtained by researchers through V-dem shows, the trend of Tunisian democracy from 2012 to 2022 has decreased. It can be seen in the graph that the Tunisian Liberal Democracy Index tends to decrease rather than increase. In 2012, Tunisia's LDI reached 0.65, which influenced by Tunisia's success in going through the revolution towards democracy, the formation of an interim government to lead Tunisia after the fall of the Ben Ali regime through the Tunisian Constituent Assembly Election at the end of 2011. In 2013, Tunisia's LDI reached 0.64, caused by protests by liberals demanding the implementation of elections because the Troika coalition parties had failed to plan the implementation of elections and draft a new constitution. In 2014, the LDI was at 0.63, and the formation of the MPR council was successfully fulfilled in January 2014. At the end of 2014, Tunisia finally held free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections for the first time since Tunisian independence. Tunisia's LDI in 2015-2016 reached 0.63, and there were three terror attacks in March, June, and November at the Bardo Museum and the Sousse beach resort. The terror incident killed 50 civilians and 12 soldiers and destroyed important aspects of Tunisia's tourism sector. In March 2016, the Tunisian army tried to counter the ISIS threat by defeating dozens of ISIS fighters in a southern city across the Libyan border. Tunisia's LDI in 2017 reached 0.65, but the economy was approaching a crisis as the trade deficit soared and the currency depreciated. In 2019 and 2020, Tunisia's LDI was at 0.63, which caused public dissatisfaction over the major parties by electing a divided parliament and Kais Saied as president. After Elyes Fakhfakh resigned as prime minister due to a corruption scandal in 2020, President Kais Saied appointed Hichem Mechichi as prime minister. In addition to the economic crisis, Tunisia also faced a political crisis in early 2021. It caused backsliding in Tunisia's democratic system from mid-2021 to 2022 (Aljazeera, 2022).

Tunisia Political Culture

Tunisia became independent in 1956 and declared a republic with a presidential system of government dominated by one political party in 1957 (Tanriverdi, 2011). Tunisia has led under an authoritarian government system since the reign of President Habib Bourguiba until President Ben Ali in 2010. So that the values, behavior, and political culture adopted are not far from authoritarianism. Although during Ben Ali's reign, a general election was held to elect a president who would lead Tunisia, the implementation of the general election was not free, fair, and transparent, where the possibility of fraud or manipulation in the election results was very high. In an authoritarian government, obedience is the main thing that maintains order and prevents chaos in society. The political culture before the Arab Spring in Tunisia tended to be Parochial, characterized by a low level of public participation in politics and limited to only certain aspects (A. Almond, Gabriel; Verba, 1963). During Ben Ali's reign, the Tunisian people tended to have a limited level of political participation. General elections are the only political component in Tunisia, which clearly shows the participation of the people in Tunisian politics. However, the general elections during Ben Ali's reign were not freely and fairly. In contrast, the general elections tended to be dominated by one party with results that were always beneficial to Ben Ali. Not only that, but Ben Ali also carried out repression against individuals, groups, and the media.

After the Arab Spring, Tunisia not only changed its government system to democracy but also tried to change its political culture to Participation, where public participation is very much needed in running the country's politics (A. Almond, Gabriel; Verba, 1963). It was done by increasing public and legal awareness and encouraging the Tunisian people's active participation in political practices through the consolidation of the democratic transition. The Tunisian National Dialogue is one form of the Tunisian government's efforts to change political culture by increasing public participation and involving civil society organizations in resolving political issues. However, the consolidation practice in Tunisia has not been

appropriately implemented due to the decreasing level of public trust in political parties. So, handling past legal and public violations as an effort to build legal and public awareness of Tunisia and encourage active public participation through democratic education to the community cannot be implemented optimally. The obstacles that occur are obstacles to developing or improving the democratic system in Tunisia and are new challenges that must be handled after the revolution. Education of the democratic system to the community in Tunisia, which is not implemented optimally, affects the understanding and way the community determines the benchmark for the success of democracy, where most Tunisian people see economic growth or development as an essential/leading indicator that determines the success of the implementation of democracy in Tunisia. Some Tunisian people can accept the decline of democracy during the Kais Saied administration due to significant positive changes in the economic sector since the revolution. It also caused a decline in Tunisian political culture, where political culture gradually changed back to parochial culture, especially among Tunisian people.


Democracy Backsliding in Tunisia

Tunisian democracy faces challenges in the form of political instability, relatively high levels of corruption, and an economic crisis that has not resolved. The challenges of political instability faced by Tunisia are in the form of interactions between political parties and society. The political transition succeeded in creating pluralism in the Tunisian political system. With the existence of multi-parties, a pattern of interaction, such as competition, alliances, and negotiations in political practice, will be created. However, the interaction between political parties is still not fully plural, where the Tunisian political system tends to be dominated by only one or two parties, namely the Ennahda party and the Nidaa party. The alliance between the two parties further strengthens the power of dominance of the two parties, especially the Ennahda party. It makes other political parties seem to be only complementary to perfect pluralism in the Tunisian democratic system because they have power far below the Ennahda and Nidaa parties. Which limits the contribution to political practice from parties other than the Ennahda and Nidaa parties (International Crisis Group, 2019).

On the other hand, the level of public trust in political parties is relatively low. The public considers political parties negligent in carrying out their duties and keeping their promises. Which caused by several cases, especially related to the failure of the Ennahda party to carry out its duties and achieve its initial goal of forming a constitution at the beginning of the transition period. It raises challenges in the interaction between political parties and the community. These challenges create significant obstacles for Tunisia to develop or improve its democratic system to achieve consolidation.

Tunisia is one of the countries with a relatively high level of corruption. Corruption is a severe crime that can negatively influence or impact almost all aspects of government. Based on data from The Corruption Perception Index or CPI, the implemented democracy has not been able to overcome the challenges related to the high level of corruption that occurs, especially in the Tunisian public sector. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows countries that have succeeded and failed in eradicating corruption. It is measured based on a scale of 0 (very high corruption) to 100 (very clean). It can be seen in Graph 2 that there was no significant change in the years when democratization had not occurred in Tunisia, namely in 2008-2011, and the years when the revolution and democratization occurred in Tunisia, namely in 2012-2022.

Chart 2. Tunisia's Corruption Level




Source: The Corruption Perception Index

Chart 2 shows that the CPI score in 2008-2011 was in the range of 44, 43, 42, and 38. Even in 2012-2022, Tunisia's CPI score was in the same range. It shows that there has been no significant change or positive achievement in eradicating the level of corruption in Tunisia. Even in several years of democracy, Tunisia tended to show a lower CPI score compared to before democratization in Tunisia; the Tunisian CPI score remained at 40 and 41, which means that the level of corruption has increased compared to before the revolution and democratization.

Economic development is one of the main motives for people to want democracy through the Arab Spring event. Increasing the Tunisian economy is the people's primary demand for the government after the reform. Because Tunisia has fairly low annual economic growth, the economic crisis has not been resolved with democracy. That shown in the Tunisian Economic Growth graph (Annual).

Chart 3. Tunisian Economic Growth (Annual)



Source: GDP Growth (Annual%) – World Bank

From Graph 3 we find out that Tunisia's economic growth in the last ten years has tended to decline, indicating that the democracy implemented in Tunisia since 2012 has not been able to improve or provide significant positive changes to the country's economic growth. Democracy has not been able to solve the challenges in the country's economic aspects. Economic growth has tended to decline from 2012 to 2020. In 2012, Tunisia's economic growth reached 4.20%, and in 2019, it reached 1.60%. Tunisia's economic growth experienced a drastic decline in 2020 to -8.80%. At the beginning of the backsliding of democracy in Tunisia it has occurred under the rule of President Kais Saied, namely in 2021. President Kais Saied managed to overcome

the economic crisis and pushed Tunisia's economic growth to increase significantly to 4.40% where the figure is greater than the Tunisian economic growth rate since the beginning of the democratization period, namely in 2012.

The government's failure to implement democracy to overcome economic problems in Tunisia has impacted Tunisia's economic growth, which also contributed to the decline of democracy in Tunisia. The backsliding of democracy referred to in this study is the backsliding of the regime that occurred in Tunisia, which was initially a flawed democracy and transformed into a hybrid regime.

Table 2. Regression Results (Tunisia GDP Score)

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.469 ^a	.220	-.039	.50390

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP Growth (annual)

Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6.269	.227		27.621	.000
	GDP Growth (annual)	-.044	.048	-.469	-.921	.425

a. Dependent Variable: Democracy Index

Based on the regression results between the democracy index and GDP growth above, the sig value shows a figure of 0.425, which means that Tunisia's economic growth or GDP growth does not significantly affect changes in the figures in the Tunisian democracy index. The R Square value in Table 2 Model Summary shows a figure of 0.220, which indicates that the significance of the influence of economic growth or GDP growth on changes in the figures in the Tunisian democracy index that caused the backsliding of the regime was only around 22%. The backsliding of Tunisian democracy began with President Kais Saied's decision to suspend parliament and the prime minister on 25 July 2021 (Boudharoau, 2021). Then, after eight months of suspension, Kais Saied issued a presidential decree dissolving parliament. In the presidential decree, Kais Saied also dismissed the prime minister. President Kais Saied suspended parliament in response to public demonstrations in several cities caused by public dissatisfaction with the parliament's performance. Kais Saied's actions threatened and caused a decline in three dimensions in the concept of democracy as freedom, namely the intra-governmental, extra-governmental, and shared understanding of facts dimensions.

The dissolution of most independent institutions shows the backsliding in the intra-governmental dimension. Which institutions have an essential role in implementing human rights protection? Then President Kais Saied issued decree 2021-117 on 22 September 2021, which contained provisions for political transition, taking over executive power, judiciary, and legislative. The decree also stated that President Kais Saied would implement reforms to achieve the revolution's goals on 17 December 2011: "a truly democratic regime where the people are the source of power."

The backsliding in the extra-governmental dimension are indicate by the repressive and violent actions of the military against a group of protesters who criticized the government. President Kais Saied also imposed a travel ban on opposition politicians. Not only that, Kais Saied also arrested and imprisoned several activists and prosecuted several journalists, lawyers, politicians, opposition figures, and civil society who had criticized him through posts on social media (Samaro, 2021). That has led to restrictions on media independence and oversight by civil society. The decline in the Tunisian government has caused changes in the Freedom of the World score, which has contributed to the backsliding of democracy.

Table 3. Regression Results (Freedom in the World Score Tunisia)

Model Summary					
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1	.977 ^a	.954	.938	.12270	

a. Predictors: (Constant), Freedom of the World

Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.110	.655		1.694	.189
	Freedom of the World	.078	.010	.977	7.867	.004

a. Dependent Variable: Democracy Index


On the other hand, the regression results between the democracy index and the freedom score (Freedom in the World) in Table 3 above show a sig value of 0.004, which means that the freedom score, namely Tunisia's Freedom in the World Score, has a significant effect on changes in the Tunisian Democracy Index. In Table 3, the Model Summary value of R Square shows a figure of 0.954, which shows that the significance of the influence of the freedom score, namely Freedom in the World Score, on changes in the Tunisian democracy index is at 95.4%.

Community Freedom and Support for Kais Saied

Civil Society in Tunisia initially strongly supported the democratization process with the hope that democracy could bring the country and the lives of the Tunisian people better than when Tunisia led under an authoritarian government. Civil society believes that democracy can overcome problems or challenges covering politics, society, and economics in Tunisia, such as high levels of corruption and unemployment; overcome the inequality that occurs; provide freedom for civil society to choose and decide in both political, social, and economic aspects of their lives. After ten years of democracy being implement in Tunisia, civil society realized that democracy could not meet their expectations, especially some problems that were expect to be resolved with democracy, which became worse. One of the community's main demands at the beginning of the revolution was related to eradicating corruption to be better than before and reducing the level of corruption in Tunisia. But what happened was the opposite: the level of corruption increased over time.

The government's failure to implement the democratic system properly and resolve problems or challenges, political, economic, and social, in Tunisia affected the fulfillment of individual rights in society. This reduced the community's enthusiasm and support for the democratic system.


Graph 4. Level of Enthusiasm and Support of the Tunisian Community for Democracy



Source: Data processed by researchers obtained through Arab Barometer

In the survey data conducted by Arab Barometer, Tunisian society showed a lack of enthusiasm and support for democracy. The data in Graph 4 shows that around 56% of Tunisians agree that they do not mind a democratic or non-democratic government system as long as the government can maintain order and stability in the country. Then, the data in Graph 4 shows that around 76% of the people agree that they do not mind the type of government being implement as long as the government can solve economic problems in their country.

Graph 5. Tunisian Society's Desire for Reform



Source: Data processed by researchers obtained through Arab Barometer

Not only is the enthusiasm and support of the people for democracy decreasing, but most Tunisians are starting to want a change in the government system. Graph 5 shows that 52% of Tunisians want a change or reform in Tunisia's domestic system, and around 34% think that Tunisia's domestic system should be replace. Meanwhile, graph 5 shows that 91% of the public agrees with political reform, divided by 30% agreeing with political reform being carried out all at once and 61% agreeing with political reform being carried out little by little.

CONCLUSION

Although the Tunisian revolution and reform process were quite successful, they managed to survive for more than ten years. However, democracy in Tunisia has not been able to function correctly, especially in meeting the demands of the Tunisian people. The decline of democracy during Kais Saied's reign has slowly brought back elements of autocracy. However, the underlying reason for Kais Saied's decision to dissolve parliament and take over executive, legislative, and judicial powers was to save Tunisia from corruption and improve the economy to get through the crisis. However, this also caused a decline in several dimensions of democracy, including the intra-governmental, extra-governmental, and shared understanding of facts dimensions. That also hinders achieving the goals of freedom in democracy, namely freedom from tyranny, freedom of speech, and equality in freedom. Most people still support, hope, and believe in President Kais Saied.

The explanation above shows that the economic growth rate based on GDP growth (annual%) shows that democracy cannot increase economic growth or bring the Tunisian economy better than before the Arab Spring. Democracy in Tunisia also cannot solve the challenge of high levels of corruption in Tunisia, where ICP data shows that corruption during democracy has increased from year to year. Although democracy seen as an excellent political system that guarantees the rights related to people's freedom, it does not mean that democracy is suitable for implementation in any country and can overcome the challenges currently being faced by the country. Tunisia is one of the countries that can be considered unsuitable for implementing democracy. Because even though it has changed leaders several times, democracy cannot overcome the existing challenges and causes dissatisfaction in society. Dissatisfaction with a

system of Government in overcoming state problems can cause a decline in the country's political system.

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