The US Economic Statecraft Failure in the Application of the Caesar Act from 2019 to 2023
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.38035/jlph.v4i5.478Keywords:
United States, Syria, Economic Statecraft, Stateness LevelAbstract
This article aims to analyze the reasons for the failure of the United States (US) economic sanctions under the Caesar Act project, which were intended to bring about a change in the Syrian administration between 2019 and 2023. In 2019, the US implemented the Caesar Act project, which involved imposing the most comprehensive economic embargo on Syria. The Caesar Act imposed explicit restrictions on all types of foreign assistance and investment in Syria. The primary goal of the economic sanctions implemented under the Caesar Act was to exert pressure on the Syrian regime to bring about a change in government due to its severe breaches of human rights against its own citizens. Consequently, the economic sanctions had adversely affected the Syrian economy, while simultaneously exacerbating the living conditions of the people in Syria. In general, a nation's resilience weakened when it was unable to fulfil its internal stability and economic objectives. However, the Syrian government remains resolute and unwavering in its decisions. The US economic sanctions proved ineffective in addressing political transformation in Syria. This article used a qualitative methodology, utilizing triangulation techniques. This article concludes that the American economic sanctions, namely the Caesar Act, have failed due to the domestic component (stateness level) which allowed Syria to refuse or disregard the economic statecraft.
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Defenders, C. R. (2022). Al-Assad: The Presidency That Never Ends. Civil Rights Defenders.
Defense, U. D. (2022). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.
Early, B. (2016). Statecraft and the Limitations of Economic Sanctions. ResearchGate.
Hanania, R. (2020). Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America’s Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do about It. CATO Institute.
Holsti, K. (1982). Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy Theory. Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World.
Hufbauer, G., Schott, J., & Elliott, K. (2009). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Peterson Institute Press.
Humud, C. E. (2022). Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Congressional Research Service, 3–33.
Illinois. (2022). The Syrian Conflict: Bashar al-Assad and His Government. University of Illinois.
Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (2007). The political economy of economic sanctions. Handbook of defense economics. 2, 867–911.
Kemal, K., & Elizabeth, F. (2016). The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect. Brookings Institution Press.
Khaddour, K. (2015). The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian State. Carnegie Middle East Center, 8–25.
Khlebnikov, A. (2023). Syria at a ?rossroads: The Economic and Diplomatic Games of Damascus. Valdai.
Levy, P. I. (1999). Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do? Economic Growth Center Yale University, 3–10.
Madouni, A., & Derradji, H. (2020). The Caesar Law for The Protection of Civilians in Syria: Objectives and Ramifications. 61–68.
Milliken, E., & Cafiero, G. (2023). Analysis: How Important is Syria’s Return to the Arab League? Al Jazeera.
Neuman, W. (2014). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Pearson.
Olanrewaju, F., & Joshua, S. (2015). The Diplomatic Dimensions of the Syrian Conflict. Sage Journals, 43–63.
Onder, H. (2022). A Decade of War in Syria: The Economic Side. World Bank.
Suliman, F., & Khwanda, H. (2020). External Sector: Between Congestion and Sanctions— ‘Syrian Economy Case, 1987–2018.’ Sage Journals.
Tabler, A. J., & Zweig, M. (2023). How the Caesar Act Restricts Normalization with Syria. Washington Institute.
USCRS. (2017). Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response. United States Congressional Research Service.
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